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PREFACE
The end of the Cold War has opened a Pandora's box of National Security
threats. Since 1950, all national security issues were framed in relation to
their effect on the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union. If one were to suggest a new threat or goal outside this rubric, it was
usually discarded before it could be resolved. The high level of American
interest in the United Nations Conference on the Environment and
Development demonstrates how the number and priority of national security
interests are changing. As the New World Order evolves, the United States
has to develop a taxonomy for framing the debate on America's role in this
process.
In 1974 author/philosopher Ayn Rand addressed the United States
Military Academy on the importance of a well-defined philosophy. She
asserted:
But the principles you accept (consciously or unconsciously) may clash
with or contradict one another; they, too, have to be integrated. What
integrates them? Philosophy. A philosophic system is an integrated
view of existence. As a human being, you have no choice about the fact
that you need a philosophy. Your only choice is whether you define
your philosophy by a conscious, rational, disciplined process of thought
and scrupulously logical deliberation—or let your subconscious
accumulate a junk heap of unwarranted conclusions, false
generalizations, undefined contradictions, undigested slogans,
unidentified wishes, doubts and fears, thrown together by chance, but
integrated by your subconscious into a kind of mongrel philosophy and
fused into a single solid weight: Self-doubt, like a ball and chain in the
place where your mind's wings should have grown. 1
Self-doubt is not a condition limited to individuals. The recent anxiety attack
that the United States has suffered is an excellent example.
After persevering for forty-five years, the United States and her Western
Allies have clearly won the military stand-off of the Cold War, but one has to
wonder about the price of this victory. It might be expected that the United
States would feel more pride in itself and its system, however the country
seems to miss the Soviet threat. The Cold War provided a convenient excuse
for America to avoid defining its basic philosophical tenets. The obvious
inadequacy of the Soviet system helped to define what the United States was
by providing a distasteful enemy to rally against. Now that this enemy is
gone the more difficult task of what the country stands for looms on the
horizon.
The United States faced a similar situation following the Revolutionary
War. The initial unifying theme was dissatisfaction with British rule. This
united the colonies in the struggle against British rule, but did not provide
the philosophical basis to build a great republic. The deficiencies of the union
under the Articles of Confederation forced the Founding Fathers to think
abstractly and debate the merits of complex philosophical issues. "There is
common agreement among modern critics that the debates over the
Constitution were carried on at an intellectual level that is rare in politics,
and the Constitution itself is one of the world's masterpieces of practical
^Ayn Rand, Philosophy: Who Needs It, The Ayn Rand Library, Vol. 1, (New York: Signet,
1984), 5.
statecraft."2 The Constitution and the Federalist Papers laid the intellectual
and philosophical foundation for the first nation based on pluralism and
toleration. At the successful end of another war, it is time for America to
consciously integrate and define what it stands for and what its long term
goals are. This is not the kind of debate that most Americans are comfortable
with, however if the nation wants to break loose from the malaise of self
doubt saturating it, Americans have no other choice.
2 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 15.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THESIS STATEMENT
This thesis asserts that America has a core set of values inherited from
the Founding Fathers that should serve as an integrating mechanism for
strategic planning. In addition to values serving as an integrating
mechanism, ". . . the value system is perhaps the most enduring part of what
we think of as a society, or a social system." 3 Effective strategic planning
occurs when these core values are articulated and operationalized. The
purpose of this study is to show how American core values developed and
were operationalized in the operational codes (paradigms) of the Founding
Fathers, the policymakers of the Cold War era, and contemporary
policymakers as they set out to define America's role in the New World
Order.
B. OVERVIEW
This study begins with an investigation of the role that paradigms play in
science and asserts that operational codes serve the same purpose for nations.
This parallel is investigated because it provides an insight into the nature of
paradigm shifts. The United States has had two identifiable paradigms
—
isolationism and the goal of nation building of the Founding Fathers and the
3 Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical &
Comparative Perspective, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), 105-6.
containment policy of the Cold War. Today the nation is attempting to build
a new paradigm or operational code to shape the new world order.
The study continues by looking at the nature of values in general and
how these values can be identified. From there, the nature of American
values is investigated. Inheritance from Western civilization, the
Enlightenment, the rise of Individualism, and the development of a unique
American philosophy are all important elements in the nature of American
values. The Declaration of Independence is then shown to be an
embodiment of these unique American values.
The examination of values yields the value paradigm of the Founding
Fathers which continues to serve as an integrating mechanism. Once
established, the operational code of the Founding Fathers is demonstrated.
The best articulation of the operational code of the Founding Fathers is found
in George Washington's Farewell Address. The statements on foreign policy
and articulation of values which lead up to and follow the Farewell Address
are examined and show how the operational code was formulated and put
into practice from the founding of the republic to the issuance of the Monroe
Doctrine.
This study then moves from the era of the Founding Fathers to the era of
the Cold War. The operational codes of George Kennan and Paul Nitze are
compared and contrasted. Nitze's operational code as applied in terms of
Vietnam is examined. Finally, lessons learned are offered.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the role American values
should play in the operational code the nation will adopt to shape the New
World Order. This study then outlines a planning model that could serve as a
device for framing the debate on the new operational code and examining the
codes of the past. It is critical of the National Security Strategy of August 1991
for its neglect of values. The new operational code must be based on core
values inherited from the Founding Fathers in order to provide the
foundation necessary for effective proactive planning by the United States as
it shapes the New World Order.
C DEFINITION OF TERMS
The most crucial definition to this study is the definition of values. For
the purpose of this study, "Values . . . are the commitments of individual
persons to pursue and support certain directions or types of actions for the
collectivity as a system and hence derivatively for their own roles in the
collectivity. Values are ... directions of action rather than specific objectives." 4
There are three types of values that this paper will be concerned with. The
first type of value is an instrumental value. Instrumental values are values
that a society uses to evaluate its policy, exercise societal control and are a
catalyst for compliance from members of society. Examples of instrumental
values are articulated in the Preamble of the Constitution:
We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America. 5
4 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Society, (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press,
1960),172.
5 Richard D. Heffner, A Documentary History of the United States. 5th edition, (New
York: Mentor, 1991) 24.
These values are utilitarian. These values can be put to work in a society and
provide immediate direction to members of that society.
The second type of value is a terminal value. Terminal values are those
values that act as a source of goals for a society. These are long term goals
which are not expected to be achieved immediately. Examples of these are the
values embodied in the Declaration of Independence, and articulated in the
second paragraph:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, That all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness.6
These are terminal values in the sense that slavery as an institution existed
when the nation was founded. Thomas Jefferson "never really expected
them to be realized in his time and preferred to place his hopes in progress, in
the promise that mankind would consummate his ideals in some
magnificent future." 7
The final type of value is an aspirational value. Aspirational values are
very long term goals which are not expected to be achieved. The "goals"
provided by aspirational values give a society a direction to move, although
the achievement of that goal is not realistic. Aspirational values are the
most idealistic values. An example found in the Preamble of the
Constitution is the aspirational goal of "forming a more perfect Union."
Achieving a perfect Union is not in the realm of possibilities, however it
gives society a goal to strive toward.
6 Heffner,15.
7 Hofstadter, 25.
The next major concept that must be defined is that of operational code.
Alexander George states that "Operational code serves as a prism that
influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political
events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs
also provide norms, standards, values and guidelines that influence the
actor's choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of
alternative courses of action." 8 The operational code is the articulation of a
nation's values. Parson tells us that "[v]alues are actualized, partially and
imperfectly, in realistic situations of social interaction and the outcomes are
always codetermined by the values and real exigencies."9 This actualization
of values is the basis of the operational code. Operational code is the
confluence between instrumental values and terminal values.
° Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of
Political Leaders and Decision-Making", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 2. June
1969.
9 Parsons, 173.
II. THOMAS KUHN: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
The United States is like a gifted adolescent passing from the trials and
triumphs of youth to the more difficult times of young adulthood. Initially,
parents, society and inertia, define the values of a youth. As the youth passes
into adulthood, it is his personal decisions that set the limits and goals of his
life. Failure to take this personal responsibility would result in a life of
directionless drift. For forty years (1950-1990) the United States identified
itself by what it was not—communism. The definition, by default, allowed
American administrations great latitude in determining what actions were in
America's national interest. This nebulous definition allowed interventions
simply by saying these actions were against communism and, therefore, right.
These administrations seemed to lose sight of what many believed made
America unique: its values. These values were used alternately to justify
repressive anti-communists regimes or ignored completely when the United
States imposed its will on the fates of nations to maintain some arbitrary
status quo ante. As faith in the operational code of containment dropped, the
search for a new operational code began. It was not until the fall of the
Eastern Bloc, that the search began in earnest.
This chapter will investigate the nature of revolutions in science and
draw parallels between a paradigm shift in science and an operational code
change for a nation. Insights drawn from this investigation will aid our
understanding of the procedure America must go through when an
operational code is adopted.
In many respects what is happening today at the highest levels of
government and coffee shops around the nation is what historian of science
Thomas Kuhn calls a revolution in science. It is the search for a successor
paradigm to replace the old paradigm of containment. In science a paradigm
serves many of the same functions that grand strategy or operational code
serve in government. Kuhn asserts that a paradigm, "stands for the entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members
of a given community." 10 Kuhn's concern was with science, however, his
thoughts on the function of paradigms and how they change is applicable to
our investigation of operational codes and how they change.
A. NORMAL VS. REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE
Kuhn believes there are two types of science: normal and revolutionary.
He defines normal sciences as:
research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements,
achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges
for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. 11
Normal science is analogous to regular day to day diplomacy and standard
operating procedures of governmental organizations. Kuhn suggests the
average scientist working in normal science, "is a solver of puzzles, not a
tester of paradigms." 12 Similarly, the average diplomat spends almost all of





grand strategy of the United States. Nevertheless, there are times in science
or the evolution of nations when the old paradigm is just not solving the
puzzles anymore. This is the time when a revolution in science is likely to
occur. Kuhn defines scientific revolutions as "those non-cumulative
developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or
in part by an incompatible new one." 13 In science, Einsteinian physics is an
example of such an event; in American history, the adoption of the
operational code of containment is the most current example.
B. FUNCTIONS OF PARADIGMS
Kuhn asserts paradigms "define the legitimate problems and methods of
a research field." 14 Once the paradigm is accepted, it frees the practitioner
"from the need constantly to re-examine its first principles, the members of
that community can concentrate exclusively upon the subtlest and most
esoteric of the phenomenon that concern it." 15 A common paradigm
provides "a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken
for granted, it can be assumed to have solutions...." 16 Returning to the
strategy of containment the legitimate problem was communist growth and
the preferred solution was superior power. The average diplomat or military
officer did not bother to question the nature of the problem or the solution






C THE FALL AND RISE OF PARADIGMS
A paradigm, according to Kuhn, goes through a fairly predictable life
cycle, "the emergence of new theories is generally preceded by a period of
pronounced professional insecurity." 17 This insecurity is the result of "the
recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm induced
expectations that govern normal science." 18 Kuhn declares:
the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing
tradition of scientific practice—then begin the extraordinary
investigations that lead the profession at last to a new set of
commitments, a new basis for the practice of science,.... 19
American policy makers are at this point. The anomalies present in the
operational code of the United States cry out for new thinking to eliminate
polices that are working at cross purposes.
As the anomalies surrounding a paradigm proliferate, an equal number
of special explanations within the paradigm arise to explain them. As the
number of explanations increase, the utility of the paradigm decreases
proportionally. Younger practitioners or new arrivals to field, with less time
and effort invested in the old paradigm begin the search for a new paradigm.
Kuhn suggests that this period "is regularly marked by frequent and deep
debates over legitimate methods, problems and standards of solution, though






debates are "characterized by continual competition between a number of
distinct views of nature, each partially derived from, and all roughly
compatible with, the dictates of scientific observation and method." 21
Proposed paradigms do not have all the answers to all the relevant questions.
Kuhn believes, "The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage
must often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving."22
Science tries to present itself as a process of dispassionate logic. In contrast,
Kuhn thinks adopting a new paradigm involves a leap of faith in the future
utility of the paradigm. He declared, "A decision between alternative ways of
practicing sciences is called for and in the circumstances that decision must be
based less on past achievement than on future promise." 23 As the country
searches for a new operational code it would be wise to remember that no
new code can prove ahead of time its total problem solving ability. At some
point in time it must take a leap of faith, when it does one can only hope that
the new code is in keeping with the values of the country's Founding Fathers.
D. RESULTS OF ADOPTING A NEW PARADIGM
Changing the paradigm that has supplied the questions and answers for a
field is a traumatic experience. Especially, for someone who has invested a
great deal of time and effort in the old one. Kuhn believes "once it has





an alternate candidate is available to take its place."24 This concept provides
insight into what may be going through the mind of Washington
policymakers now. It is probably clear to them that the strategy of
containment does not work today, even when aimed at containing anarchy.
They do not want to abandon it until there is another paradigm or
operational code available, one which appears to better answer the questions
that they face daily. Like the firestorm that followed Kennan's "Long
Telegram," these paradigm shifts seem to change fully the view of the
practitioners or leave them intact. Kuhn suggests even though there is
mounting evidence that a paradigm is no longer working, "the transition
between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic
and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at once or
not at all."25 This is a personal decision for each scientist. Kuhn asserts, "The
transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience
that cannot be forced."26 So as we stumble through this shift in operational
code one can expect to see a number of new paradigms articulated.
Inexplicably, the same light bulb will light up in most of the policymakers
heads if the United States is going to settle on a durable operational code.
A new paradigm will not be unique in all respects, because of the shared
experiences of those who previously worked in the field. Kuhn suggests a





both conceptual and manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had
previously employed." 27 Nevertheless, the results of applying the new
paradigm fundamentally changes the field, and "though the world does not
change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different
world."28 The paradigm shift and resulting change in world view affect "the
formulation of questions and answers that accounts, for more than novel
empirical discoveries." 29 So in this analogy, a switch in America's
operational code might lead to novel methods in applying its power to the
problems that now face the nation.
E. VALUES IN SCIENCE
Finally, in science, as in national security affairs, there is a role for values.
Kuhn declares, "a problem must be characterized by more than an assured
solution. There must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable
solutions and the steps by which they are to be attained."30 This is the realm
of values. For instance, during the early years of containment and the bomb,
some advised that a preemptive nuclear strike would allow the Untied States





31NsC 68: A Report to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and
Programs for National Security. 14 April 1950. Reprinted in Naval War College Review
May/June 1975, 54-110.
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response within the operational code of containment. Luckily, the values of
American leaders prevented the United States from pursuing this logical end.
Kuhn believes, "shared values can be important determinants of group
behavior even though the members of the group do not all apply them the
same way...." This is an important distinction. Just because the values are
shared does not mean their use must be uniform, in fact, insisting on
uniformity would hold back both science and society. Kuhn explained,
"individual variability in the application of shared values may serve
functions essential to science. The points at which values must be applied are
invariably also those at which risks must be taken."32
F. APPLICATION
From this application of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
it is apparent that revolutions in science and changes of the operational codes
of nations share many characteristics. Kuhn's analysis provides insight into
the process that America must go through before adopting another
operational code. Obviously the change in perception that accompanies the
change in paradigm will have a large effect on the nation's outlook. The
more benign international environment allows the Nation to pursue policies
once thought quixotic. This process may not be smooth or outwardly logical,
but without letting it run its full course it is doubtful that any proposed
operational code would endure more than the term of one administration.
32 Kuhn, 186.
16
When the new operational code is adopted, values will help define and limit
acceptable means and ends.
17
III. THE NATURE OF AMERICAN VALUES
In the introduction, we defined values. Here we will examine American
values. American values are a product of the country's cultural context. In
this case, cultural context is the confluence of economic, social, and political
reality and the current ideologies of the day. Cultural context means the
"American experience." The American experience, in turn, embodies those
elements which make up that experience, namely elements from inheritance,
from the environment and from historical experience. Talcott Parson defines
values in the following manner: "Values are the sense of commitment of
individual persons to pursue and support certain directions or types of
actions for the collectivity as a system and hence derivatively for their own
roles in the collectivity." 33 In this sense, values are directions of action rather
than specific goals. To identify American core values, one must examine the
values of America in the time of the Founding Fathers and see how these
values were embodied in such documents as the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution, and The Federalist, and how they were
operationalized in American foreign policy.
American core values are not articulated explicitly. When it came to
beliefs and values, America was of the "faith that its norms are self-
evident." 34 America "was so sure of itself that it hardly needed to become
33 Parsons, 173.
34 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political
Thought since the Revolution, ( New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), 58.
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articulate." 35 One must examine the American character to discover
American values. Henry Steele Commager asserts, "The forces that create a
national character are as obscure as those that create an individual character,
but that both are formed early and change relatively little is almost certain."36
The fact that values remain fairly constant is crucial to this study.
"'Circumstances change profoundly, but the character of the American people
has not changed greatly or the nature of the principles of conduct, public and
private, to which they subscribe.'"37 Examining the American character as it
was developing in the time of the Founding Fathers will allow us to discover
what American core values were then and how the Founding Fathers
operationalized values.
American core values are based on a number of different philosophies,
beliefs and experiences. "Out of an amalgam of inheritance, environment,
and historical experience, Americans fashioned a distinctive character." 38
America inherited their beliefs and philosophies from Europe, and Britain in
particular, but the exposure to the American frontier transformed these
values into something uniquely American.
35 Ibid., 58-59.
36 Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950) 409.





America inherited the foundations for its values from Western
civilization. The importance of studying the past lies in the fact that
"historical events establish values and predispositions, and these in turn
determine later events."39 These historical events help identify the direction
pursued. Commager states:
The American character was the product of an interplay of inheritance
and environment, both varied and complex. For inheritance was not
only British but European, not only of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries but of two thousand years. That America was an offspring of
Britain was acknowledged; that the roots of her culture and her
institutions traced back to Greece and Rome and Palestine was not to be
forgotten; and the basic institutions of state, church, and family which
Americans maintained and the fundamental values which they
cherished advertised the origin and the relationship."40
This inheritance was indeed diverse. From ancient Greece America received
the democratic tradition. Also from Athens, came the first formulation of
natural law by Plato. From Rome America inherited the tradition of law and
order. Finally, from Palestine, America embraced Judeo-Christian values,
and a belief in a moral law that had been carried down from the time of
Moses. Americans then integrated these beliefs and values into the new
ideas of the Enlightenment.
B. THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND AMERICAN VALUES
Some of the basic tenets of American values came from the




exposed the country and the world to Newtonian physics, and the primacy of
science. Science celebrated Reason above all else, and this perpetuated the
belief that all knowledge could be found through scientific experimentation.
In Europe this led to an abandonment of some Christian beliefs. But the
historical experience, which plays a key role in the forming of values was
different in America. Louis Hartz states that "[d]espite the European flavor of
a Jefferson or a Franklin, the Americans refused to join in the great
Enlightenment enterprise of shattering the Christian concept of sin, replacing
it with an unlimited humanism, and then emerging with an earthly paradise
as glittering as the heavenly one that had been destroyed." 41 Instead, the
integration of Judeo-Christian tradition into American culture was
instrumental in forming the moral code of the young nation.
The Enlightenment gave the Western world the philosophy of Hobbes
and Locke. 42 Hobbes put forth the idea of man in a state of nature, which is a
constant state of war. This state of nature is chaos. For man to overcome this
state of nature, or more precisely, give order to the state of nature, man had to
work together and surrender some of his freedom. For Hobbes, man is
basically selfish and contentious, and without government, anarchy and
terror would reign in the state of nature.
Locke espoused the state of nature too, but for him the state of nature was
governed by the Laws of Nature. Man is a rational being capable of
understanding right and wrong in the sense of the philosophy of the Law of
41 Hartz, 39.
4 2 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), Chapter One.
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Nature and Nature's God. Where Hobbes believed that the state of nature
was disorder, the state of nature for Locke was ordered because the self-
evident Laws of Nature kept it so. Although these philosophies were at odds
with one another the American had no trouble accepting aspects of both.
From Locke he took the beliefs of self-evident truths and natural rights. (As
will be discussed later, Locke's writings rationalized the American
revolution.) From Hobbes the American took the idea of man being selfish,
but instead of this being a negative quality, the American was able to turn it
into a virtue. This virtue was Individualism.
C THE INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICAN VALUES
The philosophy of the Founding Fathers which contained both elements
of Locke and Hobbes celebrated the individual and individual freedom.
Some agreed with Hobbes saying that man's self-interest was a vice, while
others saw man's self-interest, not as a vice, but as a public good. Ralph
Henry Gabriel states that the Founding Fathers believed "... the general good
is best served when free men pursue, each in an enlightened manner, their
self-interest." 43 Man should be allowed to pursue his self-interest as long as
that pursuit is limited by law.
When it came time to make the Constitution, the Founding Fathers had
great confidence in Reason which stemmed from Newtonian science.
Remaining true to the Enlightenment, their social philosophy emphasized
atomism, which centered their interests on individual man. "They thought
4 3 Ralph Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought, 2nd edition(New
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956), 11.
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man was a creature of rapacious self-interest, and yet they wanted him to be
free—free, in essence, to control, to engage in an umpired strife, to use
property to get property. They accepted the mercantile image of life as an
eternal battleground, and assumed the Hobbesian war of each against all; they
did not propose to put an end to this war, but merely to stabilize it and make
it less murderous."44 Individualism and self-interest could only be achieved
if man were free. However, this freedom must be bounded by law to protect
man's property and the property of others. "The sanctity of private property,
the right of the individual to dispose of and invest it, the value of
opportunity, and the natural evolution of self-interest and self assertion,
within broad legal limits, into a beneficent social order has been staple tenets
of the central faith in American political ideologies."45 Individualism is a
core American value that is embodied in both the Declaration of
Independence and the United States Constitution.
In America, the individual flourished in the state of nature. The "state of
nature" concept was actualized on the American frontier. As the individual
conquered nature, or more precisely gave order to nature, he grew and
matured. Like the individual, the nation grew and matured in the "state of
nature" as well. But the country did not just survive, it prospered. This
success vindicated the belief of the Founding Fathers in the individual,
because they believed that individualism led to progress. Thus, one of the




"The doctrine of the free individual grew out of and was related to the
doctrine of the fundamental law. The path that led from one to the other was
the philosophy of progress."46 But like the American character, American
philosophy contained numerous elements of different philosophies, adapted
these to the environment, and produced a unique philosophy from which
American core values are taken.
D. THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
Commager states that "American philosophy... was, like the American
character, an amalgam of inheritance and experience; and if the inheritance is
more obvious, the experience is more interesting. To confess that the formal
corpus of philosophy was inherited tells us little, for the American was a free
agent, and if the term inheritance suggests a passive role it is misleading."47
The American experience was one of taming the wild, giving order to nature.
America truly was a new world, and freed from the bondage of the past,
America embarked on the greatest social and political experiment of all time.
The frontier experience was by far the most significant experience, because
"...the frontier promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the
American people." 48 Another of the elements that contributed to this
experience was the absence of the feudal tradition in America. This had a
great impact on the liberal tradition in America. Hartz states, "When the
Americans celebrated the uniqueness of their own society, they were on the
46 Gabriel, 20.
47 Commager, 26.
4° Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Frontier in American History," from Heffner, 187.
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track of a personal insight of the profoundest importance. For the nonfeudal
world in which they lived shaped every aspect of their social thought: it gave
them a frame of mind that cannot be found elsewhere in the eighteenth
century, or in the wider history of modern revolutions."49 Not only did the
nonfeudal tradition shape American society, it also helped shaped his
philosophy.
For the most part, Americans tended to be indifferent when it came to
philosophy. Americans were practical and did not concern themselves with
philosophy per se. Their philosophy was one of common sense. Americans
saw themselves with the mission of building a new nation and could not be
bothered with thinking about metaphysical philosophies. What they needed
was a philosophy that would help them achieve the task at hand. They
needed a philosophy that was instrumental. One example of what they
embraced was pragmatism.
Pragmatism was a philosophy of inclusion and expedience. 50 It put ideas
to work and judged them by their results. It was a democratic philosophy, in
that all ideas had an equal chance of being accepted, and every man could be a
philosopher. Pragmatism was an individualistic philosophy because it
celebrated the importance of the individual and allowed the individual to
have a role in the results. Finally, for Pragmatism to be a humane and
optimistic philosophy subscribing to the philosophy of progress, it had to be
tempered by Idealism.
49 Hartz, 39.
50 See William James, Pragmatism. Great Books in Philosophy.(Bearon Press: 1950).
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As stated above, American philosophy is an amalgam of inheritance and
experience. The product of this inheritance and experience was something
uniquely American. As the American was building his own philosophy,
"[h]e embraced ideas without rigorous inquiry into their validity, abandoned
them without proof of their invalidity. He looted the philosophical stores of
the past, took what pleased him without reference to logical coherence, and
fitted it all together into a pattern that had symmetry only in his eyes." 51 As
would be expected, the result was unique and was not free of contradictions.
But strangely enough it had enjoyed a wide consensus. Commager states:
[F]or all the reluctance of Americans to exalt formal philosophy or
indulge in metaphysical speculation, they confessed, with impressive
unanimity, to a common view of cosmic processes and of their
significance to man, articulated their institutions to the moral structure
of the universe, and acknowledged in their daily lives the binding force
of moral law. The view of the universe which they held, the moral
axioms which they obeyed, the values which they cherished, can be
stated briefly because their moral code, though by no means free of
inconsistencies, was singularly wanting in qualifications of subtleties. 52
Despite its complex origins, this American philosophy was relatively easy for
the average man to understand and accept.
Three of the major sources of American philosophy of eighteenth century
America were Puritanism, rationalism and idealism. Each of these sources
was naturalized. From Puritanism, America received its morals code.
Although Americans placed great value on the individualism and
51 Commager, 28.
52 ibid. Also see Merle Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators, (New York:




nonconformity, "[i]n one realm the American was a conformist, and that was
in the realm of morals. Although he did not always observe them, he
accepted without question the moral standards of the Puritans... ." 53 The
moral sense of right and wrong was laid down in the Judeo-Christian
tradition, and was compatible with the Law of Nature and of Nature's God.
This tradition was integrated into American philosophy and values.
Rationalism in American philosophy was a product of the
Enlightenment. It was simply a restatement of the primacy of Reason and
science. While the incompatibility of rationalism and morality should have
given rise to conflict in theory, this conflict did not materialize in practice.
This resolution of contradictions in American philosophy is very common.
One reason for this, as has been shown, was that the American took what he
liked from numerous philosophies and discarded the rest. What he took was,
for the most part, instrumental. This means that it was utilitarian. For
example, Transcendentalism was an idealistic American philosophy.
However, the American embraced it not for it's idealism, although the
American was very idealistic, but for its emphasis on self-reliance. "Born of
geography, nourished by history, confirmed by philosophy, self-reliance was
elevated to a philosophical creed, and in time individualism became





American idealism has its roots in the Transcendentalism of Emerson
and Thoreau, but like all philosophies the American embraced, it was
modified. Transcendentalism saw man as a creature of nature. From nature,
man received his individuality and his freedom. These are sound American
ideals, however Transcendentalism in its purest form was not compatible
with Puritanism or certain elements of rationalism. 55 However, these
inconsistencies and contradictions failed to dampen American optimism and
confidence for the future:
American thought, like the American character, was permeated with
optimism, with the sense of a spacious universe, with confidence in the
infinite possibilities of human development, and with reverence for a
righteous God and a just moral code. Americans believed in a universe
governed by laws which were immutable and unassailable but which left
room, somehow, for the play of free will, and they were confident that
their reason was sufficiently acute to discover these laws and their will
sufficiently strong to observe them. Secular law they held to be but a
transcription of the Law of Nature and of Nature's God and accorded it
appropriate vicarious respect. 56
American idealism became a philosophy of optimism, and integrated well
with the philosophy of progress. This idealism and optimism are expressed
in the terminal and aspirational values of the American Declaration of
Independence.
55 For in depth discussion on Transcendentalism see: Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America,
(New York: MacMillan, 1941) and Robert Spiller, et ah, Literary History of the United States,
Vol. 1. (New York: MacMillan, 1948)
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E. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
The Declaration of Independence above all other documents articulates
best America's aspirational and terminal values. "That the Declaration of
Independence was a recapitulation of John Locke's Second Treatise on
Government was wryly remarked by John Adams and has been
monotonously reaffirmed, but it is pertinent to observe that Locke
rationalized a revolution and Jefferson inspired one and that Locke is rather
better known in the American translation than in the original." 57 The
Declaration espoused the values that the Founding Fathers believed to be the
best of the Enlightenment, invoking the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God
in order to articulate certain self-evident truths:
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one
people to dissolve the political bands, which have connected them with
one another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate
and equal station, to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle
them a decent respect to the Opinions of mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. 58
The Declaration was written to justify a revolution, and a national war of
independence. But it was also an expression of a new political ideology.
"Speaking ideologically—and it was primarily ideological questions that set
off the American War of Independence—this was a civil war, the most
ineluctable, the most justifiable of wars."59 The grievances listed in the
Declaration made the American Revolutionary War a crusade of good against
57 Ibid., 26.
5°
"The Declaration of Independence" from Heffner 15.
59 R. R. Brachberger, Image of America, (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), 37.
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evil—of the liberty of the New World against the oppression of the Old, and
King George was seen as the embodiment of that oppression.
The Declaration of Independence was not only a call to arms. It was also
the articulation of a national character. The Declaration is the basis of our
values when it comes to political philosophy. "This eloquent apology for a
revolution is the foundation document of our political belief."60 Carl Becker
states that "[b]efore enumerating the specific grievances against the king of
Great Britain, Jefferson... proceeded to formulate a general political
philosophy—a philosophy upon which the case of the colonies could solidly
rest. This philosophy, which affirms the right of a people to establish and to
overturn its own government, is formulated in the first part of the second
paragraph:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, That all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness; that to
secure theses rights governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any
form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of
the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying
its foundation on such principles and organizing its power to effect their
safety and happiness."61
This political philosophy was based on terminal values which yielded
instrumental values. The Founding Fathers believed that to secure mans
inalienable rights, "governments are instituted among men, deriving their
"0 Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons, What America Stands For, (South Bend, IN:
University of Notre Dame, 1959), p 215.
61 Carl Lotus Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History ofPolitical
Ideas, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), 8.
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just powers from the consent of the governed."62 This demonstrated the
instrumental value of self-determination.
Although the document is very idealistic, the Founding Fathers were able
to build upon it pragmatically when it came time to write the Constitution.
Morton White asserts, "The moral ideas of the Declaration of Independence
had not disappeared when it came time to make the Constitution."63 In the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights the Founding Fathers were able to
establish a government based on equality and dedicated to preserving the
rights of men.
The values articulated in the Declaration became uniquely American
even though they were based on universal principles. The Declaration held
hope for the rest of the world, and gave American democracy the element of
"mission." This "mission," however, was not part of the operational code of
the Founding Fathers. They were preoccupied with nation building and it
was not until the closing of the frontier that the "mission" began in earnest.
The Founding Fathers were striving to achieve the vital balance upon the
foundations of a new nation could rest.
"2
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IV. AMERICAN VALUES PARADIGM: THE VITAL BALANCE
A. THE FOUNDING FATHERS
As we have seen, the body of thought from which American values are
drawn is not without contradictions. Hartz tells us:
American political thought ... is a veritable maze of polar contradictions,
winding in and out of each other hopelessly: pragmatism and
absolutism, historicism and rationalism, optimism and pessimism,
materialism and idealism, individualism and conformism. But, after
all, the human mind works by polar contradictions; and when we have
evolved an interpretation of it which leads cleanly in a single direction,
we may be sure that we have missed a lot.64
The Founding Fathers recognized these contradictions and sought a vital
balance between the extremes of these philosophies. We have seen how they
embraced the idealism of the Declaration of Independence, and yet they were
able to reconcile that idealism with the pragmatism of the Constitution.
Seymour Martin Lipset in The First New Nation states "[mjany of the
inconsistencies point up a deep contradiction between two values that are at
the core of the American creed—individualism and egalitarianism.
Americans believe strongly in both values, and ... the history of American
social change reflects a shifting back and forth between these two core
values... ." 65 The core value of individualism is best articulated in the
64 Hartz, 63. This theme is repeated in Robert Osgood's Ideals and Self-interest in
American Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953).
"5 Lipset, xxxiii.
32
terminal values of the Declaration of Independence and in the instrumental
values of the Constitution.
Bruckberger comments on this "shifting back and forth." He states that
"[o]ften the spectacle of America in action gives the impression that
Americans are constantly shifting their ground and contradicting themselves.
But what they actually do is weigh thesis and antithesis before reaching a
synthesis."66
The main concern of the Founding Fathers was finding a vital balance, or
synthesis, between freedom and democracy. If they moved too close to the
extreme of freedom, it was feared that anarchy would result. If they moved
too close to the extreme of a pure democracy, which James Madison in
Federalist Number Ten defines as "a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person... ."67 They
feared that factionalism would arise and result in tyranny. Madison speaking
of democracy comments that "[tjheoretical politicians ... have erroneously
supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions."68 A pure democracy
"can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of fraction."69 In a pure democracy,
different interest groups would emerge, and some would be more powerful
"6 Bruckberger, 46.




than others. The result would be tyranny of the majority. Madison stated
that the solution was a republic based on a representational democracy rather
than pure democracy.
The solution was articulated in the Constitution and the instrumental
values embodied within it. The Constitution, with its checks and balances
and formula for the representation of the masses, is designed to prevent a
tyranny of the majority. However, the Founding Fathers recognized that this
could be a threat to the individual and individual rights. Hofstadter states, "It
is ironical that the Constitution, which Americans venerate so deeply, is
based upon a political theory that at one point stands in direct antithesis to
the main stream of American democratic faith. Modern American folklore
assumes that democracy and liberty are all but identical, and when democratic
writers take the trouble to make the distinction, they usually assume that
democracy is necessary to liberty. But the Founding Fathers thought that the
liberty with which they were most concerned was menaced by democracy. In
their minds liberty was not linked to democracy but to property."70 This gave
rise to the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights was added to protect the rights and the property of the
individual. It, like the Constitution, is the articulation of instrumental
values. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights are the synthesis between the
extremes of absolute freedom and pure democracy. Hofstadter states that "the
Father's image of themselves as moderate republicans standing between
political extremes was quite accurate. They were impelled by class motive
70 Hofstadter, 10.
34
more than pietistic writers like to admit, but they were also controlled, as
Professor Beard himself has ... emphasized, by a statesmanlike sense of
moderation and a scrupulously republican philosophy." 71 The Constitution
and the Bill of Rights represented the achievement of a vital balance between
freedom and government.
B. THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS
The Founding Fathers knew that they had embarked on an experiment of
the grandest scale. If this experiment was to succeed, three conditions had to
be met. The first is that the Union had to be preserved. If the Union
dissolved, the experiment would fail. The second condition that had to be
met was that neutrality must be maintained. This meant no entangling
alliances with the powers of Europe. Any political alliance was seen as a
surrender of sovereignty and a threat to the Nation. The third condition was
that peace must be maintained. Time was needed for this new nation to grow
and mature. A war with a European power could sap the strength and
resources of the burgeoning country and threaten the success of the
experiment, if not destroy the nation outright. The best articulation of this
operational code of the Founding Fathers is George Washington's Farewell
Address.
1. Washington's Farewell Address: Importance of Union
In 1796 near the end of his second term, Washington delivered his
Farewell Address to Congress. He stated that for America, and American
values to survive, Union must be preserved. In the Farewell Address
71 Ibid., 15.
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Washington articulated the values that are precious to all Americans and
expressed the importance of Union:
The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now
dear to you. It is justly so; for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real
independence, the support of your tranquility at home; your peace
abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you
so highly prize. 72
He goes on to state that Union must be preserved and that all Americans
must be on guard because it will be under attack from without and within.
Washington then demonstrated the common cultural context that all
are a part of:
The name American, which belongs to you, in your national capacity,
must always exalt the just pride of patriotism, more than any appellation
derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference,
you have the same religion, manners, habits and political principles.
You have in common cause fought and triumphed together. The
independence and liberty you posses are the works of joint councils, and
joint efforts; of common dangers, sufferings, and successes. 73
After he discussed the common culture and values of Americans he
pointed out the main threat to Union that can come from within, and that is
the rise of parties. "Parties" is synonymous with "fractions" in Madison's
Federalist Number 10 :
In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union, it occurs as a
matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished
for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations... . whence
designing men may endeavour to excite a belief that there is a real
difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to
72
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acquire influence, within particular districts, is to misrepresent the
opinions and aims of other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too
much against the jealousies and heart burnings which spring from these
misrepresentations. 74
The fear was that parties would divided the nation, and a divided nation
would perish. Differences will always exist, and parties could be useful in the
process of checks and balances. Washington warns that a party is "[a] fire not
to be quenched; it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a
flame, lest instead of warming it should consume... "75
The other danger of a divided nation is that European powers would
try to exercise control or influence over certain areas. This would be a threat
to American values and the nation itself. "[Party] opens the door to foreign
influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government
itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and will of one
country, are subjected to the policy and will of another."76 Next Washington
sets the operational code for neutrality and no political alliances.
2. Neutrality and "No Entangling Alliances"
Washington warned that neutrality was necessary if the United States
was to preserve its sovereignty. If the neutral course was not followed, then






The nation, which indulges toward another an habitual hatred, or
an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its
animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray
from its duty and its interest...
... Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an
imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest
exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former
into a participation in the quarrels and the wars of the latter, without
adequate inducement or justification. 77
By becoming involved politically with other nations, America could lose
sight of its own national interests and values, and come under the influence
of values that are foreign to the American landscape. He warned:
Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, (I conjure you to believe
me fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly
awake; since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one
of the most baneful foes of republican government. 78
Washington continues by stating that the only relations that the United States
should have with foreign countries are commercial relations. In these
relations America should be impartial and evenhanded. This is in the
American national interests. It is necessary for growth and prosperity. "The
great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations is in extending our
commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as
possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled,
with perfect good faith. Here let us stop."79
77 Ibid., 67.




The third condition that was essential for the new republic was that
peace must be preserved. Peace would allow the new republic time to grow
and mature. A premature conflict with one of the powers of Europe could
spell disaster for the nation and cause the experiment to fail. This point is
also articulated brilliantly in Washington's Farewell Address. He stresses the
importance of peace in economic terms to the country, as well demonstrating
the importance of preparing for war in times of peace:
As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit.
One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible; avoiding
occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but remembering also that
timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much
greater disbursements to repel it; avoiding likewise the accumulation of
debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous
exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars
may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the
burden which we ourselves ought to bear... .80
In the next paragraph Washington outlines the importance of peace to the
experiment which the nation has embarked, and articulates the promise of
the future:
Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and
harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it
be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free,
enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give mankind
the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by
an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course of
time and things the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any
temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it?
Can it be, that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a
nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by
80 Ibid., 66-67.
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every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered
impossible by its vices?81
Washington articulates the terminal values of justice and benevolence, and
states that a country founded on virtues must have time to grow to reach its
rightful place among the nations of the world.
Washington's Farewell Address is the best articulation of the
operational code of the Founding Fathers. This operational code was
essential for the goal of nation building. They wanted to build a power base
in the United States with their own resources, avoiding conflict, alliance and
political entanglement with Europe. This could only be done through a
strong Union, neutrality in foreign affairs, and the cultivation of peace. At
the time of Washington's Farewell Address, these values were not new.
These values had been articulated and operationalized even before the new
nation declared its independence.
C THE OPERATIONAL CODE IN PRACTICE
1. Thomas Paine and Common Sense
One of the first articulations of the dangers of political alliance
appears in Thomas Paine's famous pamphlet "Common Sense." Paine called
for the severance of ties with England for a number of reasons. Not only did
his pamphlet help arouse and justify revolutionary feelings in the colonies
which led to a declaration of independence, but, as Felix Gilbert states:
... it deserves to be mentioned that by giving precise formulation to what
were felt to be the needs of America, Common Sense also laid out the
course which the new republic would follow in its foreign policy. For a
81 Ibid., 67.
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long time, every utterance on foreign policy starts from Paine's words
and echoes his thoughts. 82
"Common Sense" was the foundation upon which the operational code of
the Founding Fathers rested.
The break with England was not only based on the instrumental
value of non-entanglement, it was also necessary in order to strive for the
aspirational value of a "more perfect Union." Gilbert summarized Paine's
thoughts on the subject: "it is the duty of America to break with Europe, to
make use of her unique opportunities, and to realize the ideal republic. "&3
The realization of an ideal republic is an aspirational value, and this
illustrates the close link between aspirational, terminal and instrumental
values.
Thomas Paine demonstrated that there were no advantages to be
gained by the colonies if they maintained connections with England. He
states that continued connection with England would involve America in
European wars that were of no interest to the colonies. His statement
foreshadows the policies put forth by Washington in 1796:
But the injuries and disadvantages which we sustain by that connection,
are without number; and our duty to mankind at large, as well as to
ourselves, instruct us to renounce the alliance: because, any submission
to, or dependence on, Great Britain, tends directly to involve this
Continent in European wars and quarrels, and set us at variance with
° 2 Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy,
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nations who would otherwise seek our friendship, and against whom
we have neither anger nor complaint. 84
Political alliances are undesirable, however, commercial relations are
necessary and should be maintained with an even hand and favoritism
toward none. Equitable commercial relations can only be achieved by
breaking the political ties with Britain:
As Europe is our market for trade, we ought to form no partial
connection with any part of it. It is the true interest of America to steer
clear of European connections, which she can never do, while, by her
dependence on Britain, she is made the makeweight in the scale of
British politics... . 85
This is one of the first articulations of the operational code of the Founding
Fathers. The instrumental values of union and neutrality are present in
Paine's "Common Sense," union against a tyrannic Britain and neutrality in
dealing with the powers of Europe. The instrumental value of peace is not
included in Pain's pamphlet because it is understood that independence can
only be achieved if the war, that began the previous spring at Lexington and
Concord, is prosecuted to a successful end.
2. Treaty of Alliance 1778
The Treaty of Alliance Between France and the United States of 1778
was the first politically binding alliance the new republic entered into. This
treaty would appear to most as a contradiction to America's desire for
neutrality and isolation. Nevertheless, the colonist believed that it was a
°4 Thomas Paine, "Common Sense," from Heffner,14.
85 Ibid.
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treaty of expedience, and once independence was won, the formal ties with
Europe could be cut at last. Dexter Perkiness stated:
[t]he Revolution itself was an act of isolation, of cutting the ties with the
Old World, the deed of a society which felt itself different from those
which existed on the other side of the Atlantic and which was, indeed,
unique in its composition and its aspirations. It is not strange, therefore,
that even in the extreme need of the moment the alliance with France . .
.
was accepted reluctantly. 86
The fact that the treaty was accepted reluctantly in a time of great need
articulates the concern that the new nation had with regard to European ties.
The first article of the treaty states:
If War should break out between [Fjrance and Great Britain, during the
continuence of present War betwan the United States and England, his
Majesty and the said united States, shall make it a common cause, and
aid each other mutually with their good Offices, their Counsels, and
their forces, according to the exigencies of Conjunctures as becomes good
and faithful Allies. 87
This article formally created the political alliance to which the Founding
Fathers later expressed such an aversion. They understood that an inherent
risk existed in a mutual pledge of defense. Should France get involved in a
war with Great Britain on the European continent, America would be obliged
to assist France. Therefore, there was great care taken in formulating the rest
of the treaty.
Article Six of the Treaty states:
°" Dexter Perkins, The American Approach to Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Harvard
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The Most Christian King renounces for ever possession of the Islands of
Bermudas as well as any part of the continent of North [A]merica which
before the treaty of Paris in 1763. or in virtue of that Treaty, were
acknowledged to belong to the Crown of Great Britain, or to the united
States heretofore called British Colonies, or which are at this Time or
have lately been under the Power of the King and Crown of Great
Britain. 88
The Founding Fathers were conscious of the danger of having another
European power as a neighbor on the North American continent. After
independence was won, the new nation would have two European powers
bordering it and possibly threatening its sovereignty—England to the north,
and Spain to the south. The last thing the United States wanted to do was
invite another European power onto the continent. But, France would expect
some sort of territorial gain for its role in helping to expel the British from
the former colonies. This problem was addressed in the next article of the
Treaty.
Article seven of the Treaty stated:
If his Most Christian Majesty shall think proper to attack any of the
Islands situated in the Gulph of Mexico, or near that Gulph, which are at
present under the power of Great Britain, all said Isles, in case of success
shall appertain to the Crown of [Fjrance.89
The Founding Fathers believed that ceding some islands in the West Indies
would be a small price to pay for France's cooperation against Britain. After




possession of some more islands in the Caribbean would not be a threat to
American trade in the area.
The Treaty of Alliance Between France and the United States of 1778
is a testimony to the Founding Fathers' willingness to compromise at that
time. The issue of whether or not to form an alliance with France was
debated at great length. Those involved in the debate were well aware of the
dangers of such an alliance. But the exigency of the moment proved to be a
greater danger and the alliance was entered into reluctantly. The terms of the
treaty would prove to be a source of crisis long after the War of Independence
was won, but in 1783, the concern was for securing a just and lasting peace.
3. Peace Treaty of 1783
The Peace Treaty of 1783 (actually ratified in January 1784) was very
important to the operational code of the Founding Fathers and to their goal of
nation building. The Founding Fathers had been arguing for Union since
1776, and Union was seen as a crucial element to the defeat of the British. In
the first article of the Treaty, Great Britain recognizes this Union:
ARTICLE 1st. His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the [said] United
States, ... to be free sovereign & Independent States; that he treats them as
such, and for himself and his Heirs and Successors, relinquishes all
Claims to the Government Propriety & Territorial Rights of the same &
every part thereof. 90
The second article of the Treaty set the boundaries of the new nation.
It set the boundaries between the United States and Canada, but more
importantly, set the western boundary of the New Republic at the Mississippi
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River. This gave the United States an opportunity to move west and to
continue to grow, and reinforced the "nation building" mission.
The Treaty is then concerned with primarily commercial relations.
Fishing rights are agreed on, credit and debts contracted before the war would
not be impeded, restitution would be paid for land and property confiscated
during the war, and there will be no confiscation of property in the future.
Article eight of the Treaty is also concerned with commercial relations. It
states that the Mississippi River "shall remain free and open to the Subjects of
Great Britain and the Citizens of the United States... ."91 This put the United
States on an equal footing with Great Britain in terms of trade in North
America.
Since peace was one of the most crucial elements to the new country,
Article Seven may one of the most important of this Treaty. It establishes
peace between Great Britain and her former colonies, and provides for the
removal of all foreign troops from the United States:
Article 7th. There shall be a firm and perpetual Peace between his
Britannic Majesty and said States and between the Subjects of the one,
and the citizens of the other, wherefore all Hostilities both by Sea and
Land shall henceforth cease: All prisoners on both Sides shall be set at
Liberty, and his Britannic Majesty shall with all convenient speed, and
without causing any Destruction, ... withdraw all his Armies, Garrisons
& Fleets from the said United States, and from every Port, Place &




This "firm and perpetual peace" was an important instrumental and terminal
value of the Founding Fathers. It was an essential element of their
operational code and helped to define what the country stood for. However,
peace had to be cultivated. This was no easy task for the Founding Fathers,
because shortly after established peace with Great Britain, a world war raged
on the European continent. Due to the rise of parties in the United States
there were those that wanted to side with England, represented by the
Federalist party, and there were those who wanted to side with our former
allies the French. The road chosen was the central road: the road of
abstinence of alignment with either.
4. The Proclamation of Neutrality: 1793
The Proclamation of Neutrality was the formal articulation of an
element of operational code that was to stand in United States foreign policy
for years to come. This was also to contribute to Washington's Farewell
Address which set the course of American foreign policy. The Proclamation
begins:
Whereas it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia,
Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and
France on the other; and the duty and interest of the United States
require, that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue
a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent Powers:
I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the
dispositions of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid
towards those Powers respectively; and to exhort and warn the citizens of
the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever,
which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition.
The Proclamation goes on to state that the United States cannot guarantee the
legal rights of those found to be aiding or abetting the belligerents, which
includes carrying contraband.
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The Proclamation of Neutrality is an important episode in American
history. It sets the course of American foreign policy as well as domestic
policy. By proclaiming that the United States would remain aloof from the
conflicts of Europe, Washington stated that this new republic would not
subordinate its national interests to the interests of foreign powers.
"Isolation" became a key national interest as well as an element of
operational code. It was a cornerstone of the goal of nation building.
Not only was "America first" in the national interest of the United
States, but the treatment of the country by the major belligerents made it
difficult for even the most ardent French or British supporters to make the
case for involvement. Dexter Perkins asserts that:
The contemptuous disregard of American rights and interests that was
shown by both belligerents operated also to prevent, rather than bring
about, American involvement. Genet, the first minister sent by
revolutionary France to the United States, conducted himself with such
arrogance, so clearly defied usage and treaty forms alike, so brazenly
appealed to the American people over the head of their own
government, that partisans of France themselves stood confounded. On
the other hand, so extreme were the misuses of British naval power, so
supercilious British treatment of American complaints, that no foe of
the French Revolution, however ardent, would have dared to advocate
openly a connection with its great antagonist... .93
The Proclamation of Neutrality was not popular with the major belligerents
of Europe. France believed the proclamation ran contrary to the Treaty of
Alliance of 1778, while Great Britain disregarded America's proclamation
with regard to the rights of neutrals. This led to the Jay Treaty between the
93 Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1955), 16.
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United States and Great Britain which attempted to define more clearly the
rights of neutrals.
5. Jay's Treaty 1794
Although relations with France continued to be strained after the
Proclamation of Neutrality, there was an attempt by Washington's
administration to improve relations with Great Britain. Great Britain still
possessed the Northwest posts, which they had agreed to abandon in the
Peace Treaty of 1783 and British tariffs placed on American shipping were
hurting American trade. There were those in the government, mostly
Republicans, who were French supporters, that wanted strong action to be
taken against the British, and war was not out of the question. They saw
diplomacy leading nowhere and wanted more to be done. However,
Washington saw that diplomacy was the right path.
Washington sent John Jay to London to negotiate a treaty with the
British. The result was the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the
United States and Great Britain: 1794, known as Jay's Treaty. In Article Two
of the Treaty, Great Britain, once again, agreed to withdraw all troops and
garrisons from the Northwest posts. The remainder of the Treaty dealt with
commerce and the restrictions placed of U.S. shipping which made the Treaty
look much more beneficial to the British than to the Americans. This became
a sticking point and resulted in extensive debate in the United States
throughout 1795. The importance of Jay's Treaty lay not in the equitable
provisions for trade, but for the time it bought for peace. Peace, as we have
seen, was a key element of the operational code of Washington and his
administration. Describing Jay's Treaty, Heffner asserts:
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... for though it provided for final abandonment of the northwest posts,
it seemed to concede more to the British than it gained from them. But
Washington correctly estimated its real value to the nation: it provided a
necessary breathing spell for peace. At his insistence, then, but by an
extremely close vote, a reluctant Senate ratified the treaty and, at least for
the immediate future, war with England was avoided. 94
The young nation was ill prepared to go to war again with Great Britain.
Although unfair trade practices existed between the United States and Great
Britain, American commerce was not treated much better by the French. The
importance of Jay's Treaty lay in the fact that it avoided war. Jay's Treaty was
"an honest, if not brilliantly successful effort to liquidate many of the disputes
with great Britain ..."95 which could have led to war.
Gilbert expresses similar sentiment about the value of Jay's Treaty:
In the light of later developments, the value of the Jay Treaty for the
preservation of a neutral course in American foreign policy must be regarded
as doubtful. French resentment over the conclusion of the Jay Treaty resulted
in the 'undeclared war with France,' and the unsolved differences in the
British and American views on neutrality played their part in the origin of
the Anglo-American War of 1812 ... .[However, Washington] diminished the
danger of conflict between Britain and America by a settlement which,
unsatisfactorily as it might be in details, removed the risk of sudden
explosion. 96
94 Heffner, pp 60-61.
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It was with this background that Washington delivered his Farewell
Address.
Jay's Treaty perpetuated the rift between Federalist and Republican.
The Republicans believed that America should honor the alliance with
France and that the Jay Treaty was too partial toward Britain. The Federalists
believed that the British should be closer allies to America, and supported the
Treaty. It was in this atmosphere of faction that Washington delivered his
Farewell Address. As discussed above, Washington warned of the dangers of
party to the fledgling Union, unfortunately this faction continued into the
administration of John Adams.
The Federalists won the White House in the election of 1796 by a
small margin. The Federalists were pro-British and they wanted to continue
to strengthen the central government. On the domestic side, the spirit of
compromise and tolerance on which the nation was founded was put to the
test when the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed. The Republicans, led by
Jefferson, saw these acts as a threat to the rights of the individual and
individual freedom. On this basis, and due to the fact that the Federalists
were insensitive to the demands of the people, the Republicans, with
Jefferson as their candidate took the White House in 1800.
On the foreign affairs side, during the Adams administration, the
United States was engaged in the quasi-war with France. The Treaty that
ended the quasi-war was the Convention of Peace, Commerce, and
Navigation Between the United States and France of 1800. This led to the
abrogation of the Treaty of Alliance of 1778:
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... ARTICLE II. The Ministers Plenipotentiary of the two Parties, not
being able to agree at present, respecting the Treaty of Alliance of 6th
February 1778, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of the same date, and
the ... Convention of 14th November 1788, nor upon the indemnities
mutually due, or claimed, the Parties will negotiate further on these
subjects at a convenient time, and untill they have agreed upon these
points, the said Treaties, and ... Conventions shall have no operation,
and the relations of the two Countries shall be regulated as follows. 97
Dexter Perkins makes the point that with the abrogation of the Treaty of
Alliance, "... from that time forward, until the momentous agreement of
January 1, 1942, at the beginning of American participation in the Second
World War, the United States never entered into close political association
with any European power."98
6. Jefferson's Inaugural
When Jefferson was sworn in as president, the Republicans hoped
that he would begin to overturn the policies of the Federalists which had
helped to strengthen the central government. This was not the case. In his
Inaugural Address, Jefferson echoed some of the same sentiments that
Washington proclaimed in his Farewell Address. Jefferson rearticulated the
operational code of Washington and stressed the instrumental values of
Union, neutrality, and peace. He reasserted the theme upon which the
nation is based—tolerance and compromise:
... All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of
the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be
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reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws
must protect, and to violate which would be oppression. Let us, then,
fellow citizens, unite with one heart and one mind. Let us restore to
social intercourse that harmony and affection without which liberty and
even life itself are but dreary things. And let us reflect that having
banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind
so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a
political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and
bloody persecutions... ."
This was Jefferson's attempt once again to seek the "vital balance" which had
been lost with the passing of the oppressive Alien and Sedition Acts.
Like Washington, Jefferson states that all Americans are of a
common cultural context, and though differences may exists, the values that
Americans share are the same:
... But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We
have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are
all Republicans—we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who
would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of
opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it... . 10°
Jefferson then continues to stress the value of Union and the government:
... But would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment,
abandon a government which has so far kept us free and firm, on the
theoretic and visionary fear that this government, the world's best hope,
may by possibility want energy to preserve itself? I trust not... . 101
This demonstrates Jefferson's concern for the preservation of the Union, and
the importance of Union on the "experiment."
99




The other major values of Washington are addressed by Jefferson as
well—neutrality and peace. Jefferson begins to list the principles that are
important to the nation and that will be pursued by his administration.
Among these are:
Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion,
religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship, with all
nations—entangling alliances with none; ... 102
Shortly after Jefferson took office, war once again raged on the European
continent. As much as the United States tried to remain aloof of European
affairs, it was inevitable that she would be somehow affected.
The European conflict once again resulted in assaults on American
shipping and neutrality. A series of decrees by the major belligerents made it
virtually impossible for American ships to conduct trade. The first of these
decrees was the Berlin Decree of November 1806. In this decree, the French
stated that the British islands were in a state of blockade and all trade and
correspondence with Britain was prohibited. Any vessel found to be trading
with Britain was subject to confiscation. Great Britain responded with the
British Orders in Council of January and November 1807. These Orders
prohibited trade with France or any of her allies or colonies. Like the Berlin
Decree vessels were subject to search and seizure. The French Milan Decree of
December 1807 was in response the second British Orders in Council. It stated
that any ship subjected to search by a British ship became denationalized and
102 ibid., 75. Although the phrase "entangling alliances with none" is more often
attributed to Washington's Farewell Address, it was first used by Jefferson in his First
Inaugural.
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was considered English property and subject to seizure by the French. The
decrees and disregard for United States neutrality made it nearly impossible
for the United States to conduct trade with the countries of Europe.
Jefferson's response to these affronts on American trade was the
issuance of the Embargo Act of 1807. This was an effort to remain neutral and
at the same time hurt the French and British so they would be coerced onto
repealing the trade restrictions and recognize the rights of neutrals. This was
not the case, however, because the desired result was never realized. "France
seems to have been helped more than hindered by the measure. In fact, the
embargo complemented France's continental system." 103 As far as Great
Britain was concerned, "... England lost a part of her American market but
this was offset temporarily by the opening of alternative markets in the
Spanish colonies, hitherto closed to the British." 104 Jefferson's attempt to
coerce the major belligerents into granting concessions on American trade
was unsuccessful:
His aim was to bring both sides to terms by withholding food and other
supplies. This was the one doctrinaire and impractical measure of his
career, and it proved a miserable failure. The Embargo not only failed to
force Britain and France to respect American rights on the high seas, but
also brought economic paralysis to the trading cities of the Northeast and
the farms and plantations of the West and South. Jefferson finally
admitted that the fifteen months of its operation cost more than a war.
At the close of his second term the Embargo was replaced by a
103 Harry L. Coles, The War of 1812, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965), 9-10.
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Nonintercourse Act, which opened trade with the rest of Europe but
continued the costly ban on England and France. 105
The Nonintercourse Act was an attempt to continue the peaceable coercion
against Britain and France. If either country would lift its restrictions on U.S.
trade, the act could be suspended.
The Nonintercourse Act was no more effective than the Embargo,
and relations between Great Britain and the United States continued to
deteriorate. The search and seizure of U.S. vessels and impressment of
American sailors continued. Attacks by Indians on settlers in the northwest
territory were thought to be incited by the British. These are the two main
reasons given by Madison when addressing Congress in June of 1812.
7. The War of 1812: Mr. Madison's War
In Madison's war message he stated that the primary reason for war
with Britain is the treatment of U.S. vessels on the sea. He cited the
impressment of American sailors, the seizure of American goods, and the
harassment of American shipping along the American coast. He goes on to
state:
Not content with the occasional expedients for laying waste our neutral
trade, the Cabinet of Great Britain resorted, at length, to the sweeping
system of blockades, under the name of Orders in Council, which has
been moulded and managed as might best suit its political views, its
commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers... . 106
Madison then addresses the Indian problem:
105 Hofstadter, 39.
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In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States, our
attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages,
on one of our extensive frontiers; a warfare which is known to spare
neither age nor sex, and to be distinguished by features peculiarly
shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and
combinations which have for some time been developing themselves
among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons,
without connecting their hostility with that influence, and without
recollecting the authenticated examples of such interpositions heretofore
furnished by the officers and agents of that Government... . 107
There are a number of possible causes of the War of 1812. Maritime
grievances and the Indian problem are two of the most well known. There
have been, however, many studies into the War of 1812 and many
conclusions have been reached, all with a certain validity. These reasons
include such motives as territorial expansion—into Canada, Florida or both,
for economic reasons—depression in western and southern states, and for the
ideals of national pride and the preservation of the republic. Cole states that:
Obviously the war came not as a result of any one cause but the interplay
of several... . The declaration was carried by a narrow margin and the
alteration of even one factor in a complicated equation might have
affected the outcome significantly... . Both sets of causes, the maritime
grievances and the internal factors, are necessary to explain the coming
of the war, but recent historians are right to give primary weight to the
maritime factors. 108
The factors that led to war may not be as important to the growth of
the new republic as the results of the War of 1812. Though no territory was
gained in the war, the war was seen as a resounding success. The fact that the




overshadowed by Andrew Jackson's decisive victory at New Orleans. With
the Treaty of Ghent, peace was once again secured and the United States could
concentrate on expansion and nation building. There was a unifying national
pride that existed after the war and the faith in the American experiment was
renewed. With peace at hand, neutrality and commercial relations could
resume.
The nation building process continued. The Founding Fathers
wanted to build a power base in the United States with their own resources,
avoiding conflict, alliance and political entanglement with Europe.
Hofstadter points out that the policies of Jefferson and Madison went a long
way in achieving this because the policies created the need for a self-sufficient
United States:
But if the United States was to withdraw from Europe economically, as
under Jefferson, or to lose its best market through war, as under
Madison, it had to find a way of employing its energies and supplying its
people with manufactured goods. Accordingly, capital, cut off from its
normal investment outlet in overseas commerce, began to turn to
manufacturing. The period of the Embargo and the War of 1812 proved
to be the seedbed of American industrialism; ... 109
This industrialism would lead to the strengthening of the economic base of
the nation and complement its independence. The only threat to economic
growth and continued independence that the United States recognized was
that of continued imperialism in the western hemisphere. The United States
responded to this threat with the Monroe Doctrine. Dexter Perkins points out
that in the case of Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams:
109 Hofstadter, 40.
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... Adams' doctrine had an economic basis. Adams disliked colonialism
not alone because it was a reminder of political subordination, but
because it was connected in his mind with commercial monopoly, and
the exclusion of the United States from the markets of the New
World. 110
The Monroe Doctrine was not just a tool for economic growth. It was also an
instrument to continue the operational code of the Founding Fathers and to
continue Nation Building.
8. The Monroe Doctrine
The Monroe Doctrine is the final formal pronouncement of the
Founding Fathers' operational code. Like the policymakers who went before,
Monroe was concerned with the growth and maturation of the young
republic. After nearly a half century, the desire to remain outside of
European alliances was still very strong. During this period, the United States
prospered and grew, and the process of nation building was well under way.
The Monroe Doctrine was the logical follow-on to the preceding policies, and
the rejection of entangling alliances played a major part. Dexter Perkins
asserts:
But there can be no denial of the fact that [the Monroe Doctrine] is, in
many minds, connected with a more general principle, the principle of
the separation of the New World from the Old, and that it is regarded as
a complement, if you will, as a foil, to the principle of no entangling
alliances and no binding political connection with any European
power. 111
110 Perkins, The History of the Monroe Doctrine, 30.
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Hence, one of the chief purposes of the Monroe Doctrine was the assertion of
the United States in the realm of foreign policy.
The United States first recognized the former Spanish colonies as
independent in 1822, after the acquisition of Florida from Spain. The U.S.
was not concerned about South America for political reasons alone;
economic reasons were factors as well. This they had in common with Great
Britain. Great Britain was concerned about the economic situation in the
New World and the effect that an attempt by the "Holy Alliance" to restore
the former Spanish colonies would have on commerce. Thus, the British
were willing to recognize the independence of the former Spanish colonies in
a joint statement with the United States. But John Quincy Adams saw this as:
...a very suitable and convenient opportunity for us to take our stand
against the Holy Alliance, and at the same time to decline the overture
from Great Britain. It would be more candid as well as more dignified to
avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a
cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war. 112
This was the type of self-assurance that was to become commonplace in
American foreign policy.
The Monroe Doctrine was addressed to the powers of Europe,
specifically the members of the Holy Alliance who may have had designs on
the former Spanish colonies. In the Doctrine, Monroe announced, for
reasons of national interest, that the western hemisphere was closed to any
further European colonization:
In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the
arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged
112 Ibid., 42-43.
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proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the
United States are involved, that the American continents, by free and
independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any
European powers... . 113
But it was not for economic reasons alone that the United States wished to
exclude European powers from the New World. The were also ideological
reasons.
As has been discussed, the United States saw itself as very different
from Europe. Based on a new political philosophy and built on the faith of
self-determination, the Founding Fathers believed that the United States was
different from Europe. Additionally, the Founding Fathers believed that our
brothers of South America should and would share the same values of
freedom and self-determination that the United States enjoyed. For this
reason, Monroe states that any attempt to reassert the European political
tradition in the New World would be seen as a threat to the United States:
The political system of the allied powers is essentially different ... from
that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their
respective Governments ... We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the
amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers
to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
and safety. 114
The instrumental values of immunity from entangling alliances and peace
were still important values at the time of the issuance of the Monroe
Doctrine, but it also became an avenue toward Union. The Doctrine was
113
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instrumental in bringing the country together behind a common cause aiding
the feeling of unity and strengthening the case for Union. The Monroe
Doctrine was not only an expression of foreign policy, but a unifying factor for
the nation. Perkins suggests:
The method of the warning to Europe is no less interesting than the
matter. Monroe and his advisers might have confined themselves in
1823 to the ordinary courses of diplomatic correspondence... .They chose
instead the course of open diplomacy. And, how, indeed, could they
have chosen better? Granted the premises upon which they acted, what
could have been more skillful? How much more effective the
declaration to Congress than an unostentatious diplomatic protest; how
much more gratifying to the national pride, ... Whatever else the
President had or had not done, he had certainly interpreted the
sentiments of his countrymen, and aroused their enthusiasm and their
loyalty. 115
All the elements of the operational code of the Founding Fathers are included
in the Monroe Doctrine. These values were essential to process of nation
building: a process that the country would be concerned with until the turn
of the century.
1*5 Perkins, The History of the Monroe Doctrine, 62-63. (Italics in original).
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V. TOWARD THE SECOND PARADIGM
The Founding Fathers' operational code was a means to an end. This end
was the process of nation building. An inevitable problem in the means/end
nexus is the tendency for means to become an end. For example, neutrality
and nonentanglement could have become ends, however, the Founding
Fathers were able to keep sight of their values, goals and national interests
and keep this from happening:
For those Americans to whom the doctrine of nonentanglement is a
fixed and abiding principle never to be debated, there is no great comfort
in the position taken by Monroe and his advisers. Blind dogmatism was
not the quality of mind most conspicuous in the men who made the
great decisions of that far-off November... . Neither Jefferson, nor
Madison, nor Monroe, nor even Adams, closed the door to the
possibility of co-operation with a European power where they were
convinced that the interests of the United States would be advanced by
such and action. They took their stand not on formulas, but on facts... .In
this... the pure gospel of isolationism was accepted with some
qualifications and exceptions. 116
Hence, the Founding Fathers did not succumb to the temptation of making
the instrumental means of nonentanglement an end in itself.
The operational code of the Founding Fathers developed a foreign policy
based on isolationism and a military doctrine based on strategies of
mobilization. The aspirational and terminal values of America remain
basically unchanged since 1825. The instrumental values of the Founding
Fathers have evolved as the threats to national security have changed. From
116 Ibid., 48-49.
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1825 to 1860 the very Union was endangered, therefore, all instrumental
values were evaluated in terms of their ability to preserve the union. At the
end of the Civil war America returned to the nation building operational
code of the Founding Fathers.
The closing of the frontier as expounded by Frederick Jackson Turner in
1893 led America to turn outward. Turner stated that "...the American energy
will continually demand a wider field for its exercise." 117 Alfred Thayer
Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt converted the old theme of expansion to the
new theme of imperialism. With imperialism came the idea of the "mission
of America," and that mission was to export America's values to new lands.
This was a major change in the American view of expansion because these
new lands were not intended as full partners, like the acquisitions of the past.
A "Mission of America" tied to imperialism produced an inconsistency
where no vital balance existed for Americans. The exportation of America
values—self-determination being a primary one—was incompatible with
imperialism.
President Wilson extended this instrumental value of the "Mission of
America" to the whole world when he voiced his intention of "making the
world safe for democracy." The neoisolationism of the twenties and thirties
gave way to the Second World War and Franklin Roosevelt's attempt to
fulfill Wilson's dream of a world based on American values. The
intransigence of the Soviets following the war showed the futility of this
vision. Values are the result of unique cultural contexts and environments.
117 F. J. Turner, from Hefner, 191.
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Wholesale transplantation of a value system is impossible. Values change
slowly and only as a result of personal choice and experiences.
The First and Second World Wars, the advent of air power and the
unleashing of the nuclear genie forced the United States to abandon the
strategies of mobilization and develop the strategies of containment
(deterrence). The second half of this thesis will examine the effect of core
values upon the development of the containment doctrine and the new
operational code of post-World War II America.
The authors do not mean to minimize the diplomatic history of the
United States between the Monroe Doctrine and World War II, but we were
concerned in exploring relationships between values and strategies rather
than simply writing an historical narrative. This thesis seeks to use history as
a means of policy analysis rather than an end unto itself.
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VI. GEORGE F. KENNAN, CONTAINMENT: THE SECOND PARADIGM
George F. Kennan
The idea of a strategy of containment originated with George Kennan.
The task of turning the idea into an operational code fell to Kennan and Paul
Nitze, who were the first two directors of the State Department's Policy
Planning Staff. These two friends, analogous to Jefferson and Adams, agreed
on American aspirational and terminal values, but disagreed on the
instrumental values necessary to realize them. Kennan posited, "In times of
uncertainty the best the nation could do was 'see that the initial lines of its
policy are as close as possible to the principles dictated by its tradition and its
nature....'" 118 Nitze the guiding hand behind NSC 68, stated in that
document, "The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in
the Preamble to the Constitution...." 119 Hence, we can assume the
aspirational and terminal values these men held varied little from those
articulated by the Founding Fathers.
George F. Kennan's position as the paramount American strategic
planner of twentieth century is almost unquestioned. Former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger in his memoirs asserted, "George Kennan came as close
to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our
118 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 32.
119 NSC 68, 54.
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history." 120 The doctrine Kissinger alludes to, of course, was the strategy of
containing the Soviet Union. The National Security Strategy of the United
States, August 1991, suggests that containment was the American grand
strategy "for over 40 years" and that the changes in the Soviet Union are a
challenge "to our ways of thinking about security" 121 Kennan, rather than
taking pride in being the brain trust behind the strategy of containment,
started distancing himself from it as soon as it became official United States
policy. In Volume One of his Memoirs, published in 1967, he asserted, "I
emphatically deny the paternity of any efforts to invoke that doctrine today in
situations to which it has, and can have, no proper relevance." 122
Recognizing the unique position of Kennan in American planning, a review
of his thinking seems appropriate. This chapter will review Kennan's
thoughts on strategy and American diplomacy, examine his concept of
containment, evaluate how it was reshaped into doctrine as NSC 68 and
survey the results achieved when it was eventually applied in Vietnam.
A. KENNAN: VALUES, NATIONAL INTEREST & STRATEGY
George F. Kennan was a career foreign service officer whose rise to
international prominence surprised himself as much as anyone. He was
serving as charge' d' affairs in Moscow, when the mission received a cable
asking for an explanation of Soviet actions relating to recent International
120 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 135.
121 The National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington: The White
House, August 1991), 1.
122 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 367.
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Monetary and World Bank negotiations. Since Ambassador Harriman was
absent, Kennan felt free to express his own views on not only these
negotiations, but on negotiating with the Soviets in general. His answer was
an 8000 word telegram, labeled the "Long Telegram." This telegram seemed
to answer many of the questions about Soviet behavior, which were
frustrating Washington, and granted him instant fame there. Commenting
on the surprisingly positive and overwhelming response, he wrote:
official Washington, whose states of receptivity or the opposite are
determined by subjective emotional currents as intricately imbedded in
the subconscious as those of the most complicated of Sigmound Freud's
erstwhile patients, was ready to receive the given message. 123
His convincing answers to difficult questions gave him the reputation as
something of a savant. He was posted to Washington where his counsel was
sought frequently over the next few years.
George Kennan is viewed, by John L. Gaddis and others, as a traditional
balance of power strategist. He stressed the importance of principles and self
interest in determining national strategy. Writing in his 1949 book American
Diplomacy Kennan contended:
our national interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and
understanding ... if our own purposes and undertakings here at home
are decent ones, unsullied by arrogance or hostility toward other people
or delusions of superiority, then the pursuit of our national interest can
never fail to be conducive to a better world. 124
123 Ibid., 294-295.
124 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951;
expanded ed., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984), 103.
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Later, in his Memoirs he commented, "when I think about foreign policy, I do
not think in terms of doctrines. I think in terms of principles." 125 He did not
explain here what he meant by principles or purposes. Nor did he list which
principles or purposes he had in mind in these quotes. Further review of his
writing suggests that his principles might coincide with this thesis's
definition of values. Again, Gaddis in Strategies of Containment explained
Kennan's view of principles in the following:
Principles like non-intervention were of course not infallible guides to
action in all situations, but they did reflect certain internal priorities
distinctive to the American system of government, and could not be
disregarded without in some way diminishing those priorities. "I think
there is a close connection between foreign policy and internal policy,"
Kennan observed, "and a change in one cannot take place without a
change in the other. I have a feeling if we ever get to the point ... where
we cease having ideals in the field of foreign policy, something very
valuable will have gone out of our internal political life. In times of
uncertainty the best the nation could do was "to see that the initial lines
of its policy are as close as possible to the principles dictated by its
traditions and its nature, and that where it is necessary to depart from
these lines, people are aware that this is a departure and understand why
it is necessary." 126
It is apparent that Kennan shares the basic hypothesis of this theses that
values are necessary for successful national security planning.
Kennan emphasized that the means of an action should match the ends it
attempts to obtain. He stressed the importance of recognizing the limited
means available to achieve national ends, thus requiring the prioritization of
interests. Commenting on this problem in 1949, he declared:
125 Kennan, Memoirs, 364.
126 Strategic* of Containment, 32.
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The problems of this world are deeper, more involved, and more
stubborn than many realize. The limitations on [what] this nation, or
any other single nation, can accomplish with that margin of its energies
and material production which it can afford to devote to outside affairs
are greater than we are often inclined to remember. It is imperative,
therefore, that we economize with our limited resources and that we
apply them where we feel they will do the most good. 127
Kennan clearly believed in balancing means and ends.
Kennan's concern with matching means with ends is also apparent in his
particularized approach to strategy. Gaddis defined particularism in Strategies
of Containment, using a quote from Kennan in the following:
Particularism would not reject the idea of joining with other
governments to preserve world order, but to be effective such alliances
would have to be based "upon real community of interest and outlook,
which is to be found only among limited groups of governments, and
not upon the abstract formulation of universal international law or
international organization." 128
The way Kennan applied this outlook is evident in his reaction to the
Truman Doctrine. He worried about the seemingly opened-ended
commitment to all anti-communist forces. Criticizing the wording of the
Truman Doctrine, he wrote that it "placed our aid to Greece in the framework
of a universal policy rather than in that of a specific decision addressed to a
specific of circumstances." 129 Undefined universalistic policy commitments
offended the particularistic sensibilities of Kennan.
Gaddis in Strategies of Containment described universalism as follows:
127 Ibid., 31.
128 Ibid., 28.
129 Kennan, Memoirs, 320.
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Universalism assumed the possibility of harmony in international
affairs, sought to achieve it through the creation of artificial structures
like the League of Nations or the United Nations, and depended for its
success on the willingness of nations to subordinate their own security
requirements to those of the international community. 131 '
Subordinating American national interest to an international body did not
make sense to Kennan, who placed a great deal of importance on self interest.
Kennan's concept of self interest in international affairs closely parallels those
of Madison on the role of interests in domestic politics expressed in Federalist
Number Ten. Both wanted to take advantage of man's innate concern with
his own self interest. Instead of dwelling on the negative they recognized that
interests change with issues. Rather than trying to control interests with
laws, they believed that it is better to allow the market of conflicting interests
balance itself.
Kennan feared that the adoption of a universalist approach in American
foreign policy would involve the United States in the internal affairs of other
countries where, he felt, it did not belong. Drawing on historical precedence
of the instrumental value of nonintervention, he wrote:
It is a traditional principle of this Government to ... refrain from
interference in the internal affairs of other countries.... Whoever
proposes or urges such intervention should properly bear the burden of
proof (A) that there is sufficiently powerful national interest to justify
our departure ... from a rule of international conduct which has been
proven sound by centuries of experience, ... and (B) that we have the
means to conduct such intervention successfully and can afford the cost
in terms of the national effort it involves. 131
130 Strategies of Containment, 27.
131 Ibid., 31.
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Foreseeing the problems in the intervention, he advocated setting up specific
criteria which would have to be fulfilled before America would intervene in
the internal affairs of another country. At the time of Greece and the Truman
Doctrine the considerations he listed were:
1. The problem at hand is one within our economic, technical, and
financial capabilities.
2. If we did not take such action, the resulting situation might rebound
very decidedly to the advantage of our political adversaries.
3. If, on the other hand, we do take the action in question, there is good
reason to hope that the favorable consequences will carry far beyond
the limits of Greece itself. 132
In his Memoirs he wrote:
Were I reacting today to the Truman Doctrine message, I would certainly
have added to this list of specific requirements the willingness and
ability of the threatened people to pick up and bear resolutely the
overwhelming portion of the responsibility and effort in their own
defense against both direct and indirect aggression.... 133
Judging from some of the results of many American interventions in the past
forty years, the Nation would be wise to make these calculations prior to
foreign interventions.
Kennan's particularized approach to strategy resembles the competitive
strategies concept in vogue during the Reagan administration. Summarizing
Kennan's approach, Gaddis wrote:
he insisted that if competition was to take place, that it do so on terrain
and with instruments best calculated to apply to American strengths
132 Kennan, Memoirs, 320.
133 Ibid., 321.
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against Soviet weakness, thereby preserving the initiative while
minimizing costs. 134
Although this was not an idea that originated with Kennan, the method
attacking at an opponents weakness rather than his strengths seems to be
rediscovered by every generation.
Finally, Kennan thought it futile to try to freeze the status quo or to
attempt to remake the world in the image of America. In American
Diplomacy he again refers to the past to justify his belief. He declared:
History has shown that the will and capacity of individual peoples to
contribute to their world environment is constantly changing.... The
function of a system of international relationships is not to inhibit this
process of change by imposing a legal straight jacket upon it but rather to
facilitate it.... 135
Kennan did not believe that the countries of the world had to try to rebuild
themselves in an image of America. It was enough if diversity of the world
was preserved from those who were attempting to remake it in the image of
others. Kennan, once again, applied American instrumental values, in this
case tolerance and self determination to planning.
B. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THOUGHT
As a career foreign service officer George Kennan developed specific
beliefs about why America had difficulty in generating and implementing
strategic plans.
134 Strategies of Containment, 56.
135 American Diplomacy, 96.
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With his particularized outlook, Kennan abhorred what he saw as a
universalistic attempt by American lawyer-diplomats to force an American
construct of law and morality upon the rest of the world. In American
Diplomacy, he asserted:
I see the most serious fault of our policy formulation to lie in something
that I might call the legalistic—moralistic approach to international
problems.... It is the belief that it should be possible to suppress the
chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international
field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints. This
belief undoubtedly represents in part an attempt to transpose the Anglo-
Saxon concept of individual law into the international field and to make
it applicable to governments as it is applicable here at home to
individuals. 136
Commenting on the Vandenberg Resolution that preceded the final
negotiations on the Marshall Plan he declared:
The Vandenberg Resolution struck me ... as typical of that mixture of
arid legalism and semantic pretentiousness that so often passes, in the
halls of our domestic-political life, for statesmanship. I had no patience
with that sort of thing then; I have none today. 137
Kennan was not against laws and morals in foreign policy. He was a very
strong believer in their relevancy in framing American actions in
international relations, but not in judging the actions of others. Writing in
American Diplomacy he states:
If ... we were able to refrain from constant attempts at moral appraisal— if
... instead of making ourselves slaves of the concepts of international law
and morality, we would confine these concepts to the unobtrusive,
almost feminine, function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest
in which they find their true value-if we were able to do these things in
136 Ibid., 95.
137 Kennan, Memoirs, 409.
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our dealings with the peoples of the East, then, I think, posterity might
look back upon our efforts with fewer and less troubled questions. 138
Hence, Kennan viewed the legal—moralistic pronouncements of many
American statesman as misplaced, which is consistent with his strategic
vision.
Kennan believed that Americans tend to simplify complex problems into
uncomplicated models which bear little semblance to reality. He cited several
examples in American Diplomacy and summarized the problem as an
inclination to prefer a single evil as the source of all problems. He wrote:
There seems to be a curious American tendency to search, at all times,
for a single external center of evil, to which all our troubles can be
attributed, rather than to recognize that there might be multiple sources
of resistance to our purposes and undertakings, and that these sources
might be relatively independent of each other. 139
For Kennan, a corollary to this single evil, was the American assumption that
American actions were the determining factor in world events. Commenting
on those who believed that America "lost China", he contended, "they
seriously distorted the understanding of a great many Americans about
foreign policy, implying that our policy was always the decisive mover of
events everywhere in the world." 14 "
America's aversion to taking actions that are in its best interest but do not
fall into some universalistic doctrine troubled Kennan. He wrote:




I have been struck by the congenital aversion of Americans to taking
specific decisions on specific problems, and by their persistent urge to
seek universal formulae or doctrines in which to clothe and justify
particular actions. We obviously dislike to discriminate. 141
Failure to discriminate vital from nonvital interests in applying the
containment strategy would prove costly to the United States. When this
discrimination is necessary, understanding the core values of the nation will
be absolutely critical to making a clear decision.
Kennan discounted the importance of force and coercion in international
relations and strategy. He thought that unless the impetus to change came
from within the targeted country, it would not last:
Any message we may try to bring to others will be effective only if it is in
accord with what we are to ourselves, and if this is something
sufficiently impressive to compel the respect and confidence of a world,
which ... is still more ready to recognize and respect spiritual distinction
than material opulence. 142
It was very important to him that force be used only in situations where it
was apparent that the national interest could be served in no other way. The
cold war preoccupation with the "physical strength, armaments,
determination and solidarity with other free nations," was only meant to be a
means to an end. Uses of force he concluded:
can only remain sterile and negative if they are not given meaning and
substance by something which goes deeper and looks further ahead than
the mere prevention of war and the frustration of imperialistic
expansion. 143
141 Kennan, Memoirs, 322.
142 American Diplomacy, 158.
143 Ibid., 153.
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Commenting on change in the Soviet Union, he declared, "the most
important influence that the United States can bring to bear upon internal
developments in Russia will continue to be the influence of example." 144
Hence, Kennan believed that force was to be used only as a last resort in
support of deeply held values, not just to counter "imperialist expansion."
Kennan feared written doctrine. Although Kennan is still associated with
the strategy of containment, he never explicitly wrote a complete text of his
strategic vision. He explained, "I had no confidence in the ability of men to
define hypothetically in any useful way, by means of general and legal
phraseology, future situations which no one could really imagine or
envisage." 145 The dearth of strategic thinking in American government
following the writing of NSC 68 seems to support Kennan's concern.
C KENNAN'S OPERATIONAL CODE: THE CONTAINMENT POLICY
George Kennan's original strategy of containment bears scant
resemblance to the containment strategy that followed in later
administrations. Kennan's concern was Russia, not communism. In volume
one of his Memoirs Kennan, explained the reasoning behind his operational
code of containment:
The purpose of "containment" as then conceived was not to perpetuate
the status quo to which the military operations and political
arrangements of World War II had led; it was to tide us over a difficult
time and bring us to a point where we could discuss effectively with the
Russians the drawbacks and dangers this status quo involved, and to
144 Ibid.
145 Kennan, Memoirs, 405.
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arrange with them for its peaceful replacement by a better and sounder
one. 146
Kennan saw containment as a bridge to a better more stable world, however,
others saw it as a clear articulation of a paradigm for American survival.
Kennan believed the first priority of American policy should be to restore
the natural balance of power in Asia and Europe. To do this he stressed the
importance of improving the economic and psychological condition of
Western Europe and Japan, while down playing their military weakness.
Summarizing Kennan's thinking Gaddis wrote:
More serious was the possibility of conquest by psychological means:
The danger that the people of Western Europe and Japan, two of the five
vital centers of industrial power, might become so demoralized by the
combined dislocations of war and reconstruction as to make themselves
vulnerable, through sheer lack of self-confidence, to communist-led
coups, or even to communist victories in free elections.... It was against
this contingency that the strategy of containment was primarily aimed—
not Soviet military attack, not international communism, but rather the
psychological malaise in countries bordering on the Russian sphere of
influence that made them, and hence the overall balance of power,
vulnerable to Soviet expansive tendencies. 147
Ultimately, Kennan's strategy of containment aimed at this "psychological
malaise."
To bring a person out of a psychological malaise is a difficult job for a
trained psychiatrist, but ending it for the diverse societies of Western Europe
and Japan was Herculean task. Kennan's approach was in keeping with his
particularized model of planning. Kennan outlined the approach he favored
146 Ibid., 365.
147 Strategies of Containment, 35.
78
to countering the Soviets in two Foreign Affairs articles, "The Sources of
Soviet Conduct" in July 1947 and "America and the Russian Future" in April
1951. In these articles he advocated restoring the balance of power in Eurasia
by increasing the self confidence of those threatened by Soviet expansion,
exploiting the inherent instability of the Soviet system and countering Soviet
actions at any point "where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests
of a peaceful and stable world." 148 By aiding the organic forces of resistance in
Eurasia, Kennan hoped to thwart Soviet expansion and improve America's
position in the world. Kennan's particularized approach to containment
stressed intervening only where the national interest was clearly threatened
and using core values to judge only American actions. When Kennan's
operational code of containment is compared to containment as practiced
over time there are few areas of agreement.
148 George F. Kennan, Foreign Affairs, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," July 1947, 566-82
and George F. Kennan, Foreign Affairs, "American and the Russian Future," April 1951, 353-371.
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VII. PAUL NITZE, NSC 68 AND AD HOC DECISIONMAKING
Paul Nitze replaced George Kennan as head of Policy Planning Staff at the
State Department. During Nitze's tenure the strategy of containment was
written into doctrine as NSC 68, which served as the common starting point
for national security decisions for two generations. Although Nitze served as
Kennan's deputy on the Policy Planning Staff, their personalities, strengths
and approaches to planning were quite different. The authors of The Wise
Men compared them this way:
State's new planner was a technician and a numbers man, a pragmatist
who understood the military and liked it. Military considerations had
been almost missing from Kennan's planning. Kennan was emotional,
intuitive, he understood broad forces that swept nations, but little about
the physical requirements of stopping Soviet tanks at the Rhine. 149
Kennan opposed the writing of NSC 68 for several reasons. On principle he
resisted written doctrines. Additionally, he did not believe several of the
underlying assumptions that were to be used in writing it. Walter Isaacson
and Evan Thomas in The Wise Men suggest:
He did not believe there was a need for a massive military build up. He
did not believe that the Soviets would attack the U.S. unless provoked.
The document would be clumsy and overstated, he feared, and serve
only to inflame politicians who interfered with the successful conduct of
diplomacy...."150
149 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They
Made, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, Touchstone Ed. 1988), 489.
150 ibid., 495.
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Following recent Western setbacks in Czechoslovakia, China and the Soviet
success in exploding an atomic device, most administration officials found it
easy to disregard Kennan's apprehensions.
These "setbacks" had the effect of forcing the Truman Administration
into making a decision on pursuing a hydrogen bomb. To put the decision
into perspective Truman ordered, "the complete reexamination of national
security policy...." 151 This reexamination is now known as NSC 68. Nitze
explained the Policy Planning Staff's mandate in his memoirs as follows:
It was my view that the investigation should take a broad perspective
and examine both where we stood and where we should wish to be in
the future in terms of a broad conception of our national security 152
Most in the Truman Administration feared the mounting build-up in Soviet
military capabilities. They thought that the military balance would shift in
favor of the Soviets, if the United States did not significantly increase military
spending. The administration believed public and congressional support for
increased spending on foreign aid and military spending was lacking.
Experience showed that fear worked. Isaacson and Thomas assert that Nitze
was willing to use it again:
The public had to be persuaded. The way to that, Nitze knew from
experience was to scare them: To tell them that the Soviets were poised
to attack, and that the U.S. had to meet them everywhere. That was the
message that Nitze gave to the drafter of NSC-68: he told them to "hit it
hard." 153
151 Strategies of Containment, 82.
152 Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to
Glasnost: At the Center of Decision-A Memoir, (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 93.
153 The Wise Men, 496-497.
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Whether scaring the public was the administration's intention is open to
debate, however when coupled with the Korean War that was its effect.
A. AMERICAN VALUES
NSC 68 explains the authors' concept of the "Fundamental Purpose of the
United States," which was they said:
laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: "... to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the
fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free
society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.
Few would argue with this explanation, however, this can not be said for the
description of the "Fundamental Design of the Kremlin," which was:
to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and
second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet
leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic
extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any
effective opposition to their authority. 154
NSC 68 declares that the nature of the clash between the United States and the
USSR was a "conflict in the realm of ideas and values." 155
B. OBJECTIVES
NSC 68 lists three specific objectives:
1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we
affirm our values in the conduct of national life, and in the
development of our military and economic strength.
154 NSC 68, 54.
155 Ibid.
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2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and
economic system in the free world....
3. But beyond affirming our values, our policy and actions must be such
as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a
change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and
perhaps the most important step. 156
The document goes on to demand world leadership by the United States that
requires it to "attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order
and justice [among nations] by means consistent with the principles of
freedom and democracy." 157 In pursuing this leadership role, the document
does not articulate any limits on American interests.
Like any formulation of strategy, NSC 68 required numerous assertions
and assumptions. These assumptions had the effect of altering greatly
Kennan's strategy of containment. These assertions and assumptions paint a
bleak outlook for the West, unless it took immediate corrective action. The
assertion that drove the rest of the strategy was, "Without superior aggregate
military strength, a policy of 'containment' which is in effect a policy of
calculated and gradual coercion—is no more than a policy bluff." 158 After
asserting this need of superior strength, NSC 68 goes on to explain the ways
the West has fallen behind the Soviets. 159 If one believed this dismal




159 First, the Soviet Union is widening the gap between its preparedness for war and the
unpreparedness of the free world for war.... Second, the Communist success in China, taken
with the politico-economic situation in the rest of South and South-East Asia, provides a
springboard for a further incursion in this troubled Area.... Third, The Soviet Union holds
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The military balance of power was particularly disturbing, according to
Nitze. NSC 68 declared:
that our present weakness would prevent us from offering resistance at
any of several vital pressure points. The only deterrent we can present
to the Kremlin is the evidence we make any of the critical points which
we cannot hold the occasion for a global war of annihilation. 160
Even the atomic balance that this threat of annihilation was based upon was
thought to be endangered. 161 They believed the balance of atomic terror was
less stable following the Soviet explosion than when America held a
monopoly. "The existence of two large atomic capabilities in such a
positions in Europe which, if it maneuvers skillfully, could be used to do great damage to the
Western European economy and to the maintenance of the Western orientation of certain
countries, particularly Germany and Austria. Fourth, despite (and in part because of) the
Titoist defection, the Soviet Union has accelerated its efforts to integrate satellite economy
with its own and to increase the degree of autarchy within the areas under its control. Fifth,
meanwhile Western Europe, with American (and Canadian) assistance, has achieved a record
level of production. However, it faces the prospect of a rapid tapering off of American
assistance without the possibility of achieving, by its own efforts, a satisfactory equilibrium
with the dollar area.... Sixth, throughout Asia the stability of the present moderate
governments ... is doubtful Assistance in economic development is important as a means of
holding out to the peoples of Asia some prospect of improvement in standards of living under
their present governments....
Seventh, and perhaps most important, their are indications of a let-down of United States
efforts under the pressure of the domestic budgetary situation, disillusion resulting from
excessively optimistic expectations about the wisdom of continuing to strength the free nations
as against preparedness measures in light of the intensity of the cold war.
Eight, there are grounds for predicting that the United States and other free nations, will
within a period of a few years at most experience a decline in economic activity of serious
proportions unless more positive government programs are developed than are now available.
NSC 68, 76-77.
160 Ibid., 80.
161 It is estimated that, within the next four years, [1954] the U.S.S.R. will attain the
capability of seriously damaging vital centers of the United States, provided it strikes a
surprise blow and provided further that the blow is opposed by no more effective opposition
than we now have programmed. Ibid., 82.
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relationship might well act, therefore, not as a deterrent, but as an incitement
to war."162 The balance of power assumed by NSC 68 was a very touchy scale
that required enlightened use of American money and power to survive.
C OPERATIONAL CODE: STRIVING FOR A POSITION OF STRENGTH
Negotiating only from a position of strength is a recurring theme in NSC
68. Its drafters saw the United States and its allies in a position of weakness.
They sought to improve the balance of power, especially military power,
before engaging in negotiations with the Soviets. NSC 68 explained the
necessity of only negotiating from a position of strength in the following:
This situation is one which militates against successful negotiations with
the Kremlin—for the terms of agreements on important pending issues
would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if
not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. Unless
a decision had been made and action undertaken to build up the
strength, in the broadest sense, of the United States and the free world,
an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms acceptable to us
would be ineffective and probably long drawn out, and might thereby
seriously delay the necessary measures to build up strength. 163
Insisting on overwhelming position of strength before beginning
negotiations defeats the purpose of negotiations. The unrealistic goal of
maintaining or obtaining a position of strength in all aspects of power became
the overriding driver in American policy.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS




1. Continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected
programs for carrying out those polices;
2. Isolation;
3. War; and
4. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military
strength of the free world than provided under a, with the purpose of
reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without
war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free
world is attacked. 164
The drafters strongly recommended adopting option d. NSC 68 outlined
eleven specific recommendations required, "to win the peace and frustrate
the Kremlin design...." 165 The far reaching nature and expense of these
164 Ibid., 87-88.
165 These were:
(1) The development of an adequate political and economic framework for the
achievement of our long range objectives.
(2) A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes adequate to meet the
requirements for the tasks listed in section D-l.
(3) A substantial increase in military assistance programs, designed to foster cooperative
efforts, which will adequately and efficiently meet the requirements of our allies for the task
referred to in Section D-le.
(4) Some increase in economic assistance programs and recognition of the need to continue
these programs until their purposes have been accomplished.
(5) A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance of payment, along the
lines already approved by the President. (6) Development of programs designed to build and
maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt
psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to
frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.
(7) Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in
the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to
fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.
(8) Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.
(9) Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.
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recommendations makes it easy to understand why the Truman
Administration feared they would lack the necessary public and congressional
support to enact their recommendations.
E. COMPARISON: KENNAN'S OPERATIONAL CODE VS. NITZE'S
The major differences between the strategies of containment advocated by
George Kennan and NSC 68 are in the assumptions they made relating to
America's role in the world and the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
Although both professed a belief in maintaining the balance of power, the
drafters of NSC 68 thought the scales were delicately balanced. Any additional
changes to it would tilt the balance irreparably to the side of the Soviets. In
contrast, Kennan argued "that there were only five meaningful centers of
power in the world ... and that as long as no more than one of these was
under hostile control, international equilibrium would be preserved." 166 The
differing assumption on the stability of the balance of power tended to drive
the differences in strategy advocated by NSC 68 and George Kennan.
Whereas Kennan believed America could pick and choose its stands and
methods, NSC 68 called for holding the line against the Soviets everywhere.
Kennan thought, "economic aid would produce greater benefits per dollar
expended than would military build-up." 167 The growing capabilities of
(10) Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign
assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs.
(11) Increased taxes. Ibid., 100-101.
166 John L. Gaddis, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," International Security
Spring 1980, 165.
167 Strategies of Containment, 62.
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Soviet armed forces alarmed the drafters of NSC 68. Kennan and Charles
Bohlen's assessment, the administrations primary Soviet experts, that the
Soviets had no intention of using their military capability against the United
States in a direct confrontation carried little weight in the risk adverse
bureaucracy. Paul Nitze observed, "we are in the position of being unable to
prove either that the Soviets would or would not use force." 168 Faced with a
verifiable increase in Soviet military strength and an unverifiable intuitive
judgment that Soviet intentions remained relatively benign to American
interests, NSC 68 advocated an American military build up to ensure the
Western ability to counter the perceived Soviet threat. Kennan advocated the
use of a variety of measures to counter the threat, including political,
economic, psychological and military, in contrast to the preponderance of
military force championed in NSC 68.
Since the drafters of NSC 68 perceived a delicate balance of power, no
country could be allowed to fall under Soviet control no matter how
insignificant industrially or politically. Samuel Wells in an article titled
"Sounding the Tocsin" asserted:
[NSC 68] identifies the mission of the United States as exercising active
leadership of the free world in a global conflict with the Soviet Union
that proceeds on political, military, and ideological levels. 169
Thus the United States acquired the role of maintaining world order and
abandoning the instrumental value of nonintervention outside the Western
168 Ibid., 84.
169 Samuel F. Wells Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,
International Security, Fall, 1979, 139.
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Hemisphere. This meant deserting Kennan's early construct of competitive
strategies. "Frustrating the Kremlin design," became an end in itself, not a
means to an end. Defining American interests in terms of threats was a
reactive end. When combined with no apparent limit on means, it risked
bankrupting the country.
Other assumptions relating to the balance of power in NSC 68 also
increased the strains on the American budget. In a Spring 1980 article in
International Relations, Gaddis contended:
changes in the balance of power, they asserted, could occur not only as
the result of military action, but also from such intangibles as
intimidation, humiliation, or even loss of credibility.... World order,
and with it American security, had come to depend as much on the
perception of the balance of power as on what that balance actually was.
And the perceptions involved were not just those of statesmen
customarily charged with conducting international affairs; they reflected
as well mass opinion, foreign as well as domestic, informed as well as
uninformed .... Before such an audience, even the appearance of a shift
in power relationships could have unnerving consequences; judgments
based on such traditional criteria as geography, economic capacity, or
military potential now had to be balanced against considerations of
image, prestige, and credibility. The effect was to vastly increase the
number and variety of interests deemed relevant to the national
security, and to blur distinctions between them. 170
Far flung interests and concerns, if not prioritized and limited bear little
semblance to true strategic thought.
Nitze, writing after NSC 68 was made public, defended the framers of
NSC 68. He asserted, "We were fully aware ... of the limitations of means." 171
170 Gaddis, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered" 166.
171 Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered" International Security,
Spring 1980, 174.
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There is little doubt that Nitze did understand the limitations of means,
however, he seems to forget that NSC 68 was not written for the drafters
edification. Secretary Acheson later declared, "The purpose of NSC-68 was to
so bludgeon the mass mind of 'top government' that not only could the
President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out." 172
Isaacson and Thomas observed:
The problem is that the cautionary, private views of men like Acheson
and Nitze are quickly forgotten. Their bolder, simpler pronouncements,
however, are remembered, and believed by ordinary citizens and their
congressmen. 173
It is unrealistic to assume, as Nitze does, that the bureaucracy should have
understood limitations that were not included in their marching orders.
Finally, there is the difference the two codes placed on values. Both codes
accepted traditional American values and a list compiled by the two would
not vary substantially. How to use these values in national security affairs,
however, differed greatly. Kennan thought values should be used for judging
American behavior alone, while NSC 68 use American values to judge the
behavior of others. In American Diplomacy, Kennan declared, "it behooves
us Americans ... to extinguish once and for all, our tendency to judge others
by the extent they contrive to be like ourselves." 174 Although NSC 68 pays lip
service to tolerance of diversity, its stated objectives and recommendations
172 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: May Years in the State Department, (New
York: W.W Norton Co., 1969), 347.
173 The Wise Men, 502.
174 American Diplomacy, 135.
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show a lack of trust in any value system other than our own to prosper on its
own. For instance the second of three objectives reads:
We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and
economic system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation,
abroad as well as home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our
own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design. 175
Stability in the third world was possible only by expanded American
supported initiatives such as:
the efforts of other important countries to develop effective institutions
to improve the administration of their affairs.... [T]he moderate regimes
now in power in many countries ... will probably be unable to restore or
retain their popular support and authority unless the are assisted in
bringing about a more rapid improvement of the economic and social
structure than present programs will make possible. 176
It seems like what they were really saying was that these administrations
could not maintain power unless they became more like the United States.
NSC 68 clearly saw the exportation of American values as fundamental to a
stable world. It declared, "our system of values can become perhaps a
powerful appeal to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a
refuge from anxieties, bafflement and insecurity." 177 American values
developed from a unique environment over several centuries. Any attempt
to impose them on another culture, as NSC 68 implies, is bound for failure.
NSC 68 served as the basis of the American operational code for over a
generation. In hindsight, it is easy to see that its concept of a monolithic




Communist bloc was incorrect. Many of its assumptions regarding Soviet
intentions, military capabilities and especially economic potential proved
glaringly wrong. Nevertheless, viewed in historical context these
assumptions are understandable. In the heat of the Korean War and its
immediate aftermath the operational code based on NSC 68 made sense, but
one has to wonder how it could have survived to the end of the eighties.
Like the Sirens' song to the ancient mariners, policymakers found the
operational code of NSC 68 irresistible they were when confused and
insecure. They often applied this ready made, easily understood, operational
code in situations that many now believed shared no commonality with the
original situation.
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VIII. VIETNAM: NITZE'S CODE APPLIED
When NSC 68 was drafted the probability of its recommendations being
adopted fully was uncertain at best. Secretary of Defense Johnson had made
holding the line on defense spending his overriding goal. Congress was
tiring of America's ever expanding role in world affairs, especially the cost
which made increasing domestic spending more difficult. World events,
such as, the first Berlin Blockade, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and
the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War seemed to support NSC 68's
assumptions, however, it is doubtful that the overwhelming endorsement of
its recommendations in 1950 would have occurred had the Korean War not
begun and seemed to fit the doctrine's warnings so well. The "Red Scare"
stunted the healthy national debate normally conducted on such a far
reaching national security strategy proposal. The debate collapsed into a
defense spending spree based on NSC 68's recommendations when the
Korean War started.
In the following case study we will trace the American Operational Code
as it evolved over the next four decades, concentrating primarily on the
United States involvement in Vietnam. Some of the recurring themes in the
application of this operational code were: the delicate balance of power which
led the United States to believe in the "domino theory;" the need to
intervene militarily to prevent any country from falling to "world"
communism; a new importance placed on the perception of power;
reluctance to negotiate from anything but a position of power; and using
American values to judge the performance of other countries behavior.
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Finally, policy makers citing strategy of containment were willing to subvert
traditional values for short term expediency.
A. VIETNAM
America's experience in French Indochina prior to the Second World
War was almost nil. From then on, however, the United States and Vietnam
seemed to be bound up in a continuous war, sometimes allies, sometimes
enemies. President Roosevelt was an anti-colonialist and initially was against
the reoccupation of Indochina by France at the completion of World War
Two. He changed his stance because of the importance he placed on France's
cooperation in Post-War Europe. Hence, Roosevelt was the first of six
presidents to support intervention in Vietnam and to ignore instrumental
value of nonintervention outside the Western Hemisphere.
1. Truman Administration: Supplying the French
The United States was publicly neutral in Indochina until 1950. It
stated publicly that it would not "assist or participate in forceful measures for
the imposition of control" by France in Indochina. President Truman
allowed France to divert military aid designated for Europe to Vietnam. He
saw it as a way of appeasing his French allies and gaining their support for
American initiatives in Europe. 178 It was not until the fateful year of 1950 and
the Korean War that the United States changed its public nonalignment and
overtly aided the French in Indochina. The administration came to believe
that a French defeat in Indochina was a threat to the United States. Several
178 George M. Katun, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 7.
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factors contributed to this belief. The Truman administration came to see
colonialism as the lessor of two evils when the alternative was communism.
Secretary of State Marshall asserted that he was unwilling to see "colonial
empires and administrations supplanted by philosophies and political
organizations emanating from the Kremlin." 179 Additionally the Truman
Administration worried that if they failed to comply with French requests for
aid in Indochina that the French would not support American initiatives in
Western Europe.
George Herring author of America's Longest War, suggests that in
the new game of perceptions:
The loss of an area so large and populous would tip the balance of power
against the United States. Recent Communist triumphs had already
aroused nervousness in Europe, and another major victory might tempt
the Europeans to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union. 180
To justify open military and economic aid to France in Indochina Secretary of
State Acheson on 8 May 1950 declared:
The United States Government, convinced that neither national nor
democratic evolution exists in any area dominated by Soviet
imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its
economic and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina
and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting
these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development. 181
179 George C. Herring America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975,
2nd. ed., (Philadelphia: Temple University Tress, 1986), 10.
180 Ibid., 13.
181 U.S. Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense
History of United States Decision-Making on Vietnam, Senator Gravel Edition, Vol. 1, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971), 588.
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The loss of French Indochina was thought to endanger American defense of
the Pacific by possible interference in the sea lines of communication.
Economically it could disrupt the Japanese economy which depended on
Southeast Asia as a market for its goods and a source of food and raw
materials. Finally, in the zero sum mind set of the times, it was assumed that
any loss of real estate, raw materials or population by one side was an equal
gain for the other and that this addition would further endanger the
neighbors of the fallen dominos. Over the next twenty five years the reasons
given for the importance of maintaining noncommunist governments
would change, but somehow they always fit into the operational code of
containment. 182
The assumptions guiding American policy in Indochina in 1950 were
"misguided" according to Herring. 183 Author George Kahin agrees, in his
work Intervention he declared, "Most Americans could not accept the idea of
a fusion of nationalism and communism in one movement...." 184 Herring
suggests the United States did not understand, "the Southeast Asian
revolutions were not inspired by Moscow and, although the Soviet Union
and China at times sought to control them, their capacity to do so was
limited ...." The American belief in a monolithic communist movement
dismissed the nationalist character of Ho Chi Minn's movement.
Commenting of Ho's predicament Herring asserted:
182 Herring, 13-15.
183 America's Longest War, 15.
184 Kahin, 27.
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Although a dedicated Communist, Ho was no mere tool of the Soviet
Union, and while he was willing to accept help from the major
Communist powers-indeed, he had no choice but to do so-he was not
prepared to subordinate Vietnamese independence to them. Vietnam's
historic fears of its larger northern neighbor made submission to China
especially unlikely." 185
These questionable assumptions carried over to successive administrations.
2. Eisenhower and Dulles: The Start of Direct Intervention
The Eisenhower administration accepted the operational code of
containment developed by the Truman administration. Its application in
Indochina, initially, remained virtually unchanged. 186 In his memoirs
Eisenhower declared, "Ho Chi Minh was, of course, a hard core Communist,
while the Vietminh ... were supported by the Chinese Communist in the
North." 187 Describing the difference between the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations' containment policies, Dulles's biographer Townsend
Hoopes wrote:
This could be described as a policy of "containment plus", differing from
the basic Truman-Acheson strategy chiefly in its urge to be more activist,
not merely "for" the free nations but "against" the communist
adversary. 188
This more activist approach manifested itself in greater intervention
into the affairs of Vietnam as the situation deteriorated.
185 Herring, 15.
186 Ibid., 25.
187 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, (New York:
Doubleday & Company, 1963; Signet, 1965), 405.
188 Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company 1973), 162.
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Having decided to back the French efforts in Indochina in 1950, the
United States was faced with another big policy decision in 1954. The futility
of the French military effort was made shockingly apparent by the debacle at
Deinbienphu. The French pleaded for American military intervention to
reverse their predicament on the eve of the Geneva Conference. Dulles and
Eisenhower demanded the fulfillment of three strict requirements before the
United States would intervene directly. The requirements according to
Eisenhower's memoirs were: "a legal right under international law; second,
was a favorable climate of Free World opinion; and third favorable action by
congress." 189 Dulles reasoned that American prestige would be "engaged to a
point where we would want to have a success. We could not afford a defeat
that would have world-wide repercussions." 190 Congressional leaders set
three conditions of their own. The most difficult of these required that
"United States intervention must be part of a coalition to include the other
free nations of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the British
Commonwealth." 191
When it became apparent that meeting this condition was not going
to happen, Congressional leaders held back support. Even though Congress
did not question the "assessment of the gravity of the situation," Herring





United States furnishing 90% of the Manpower....'" 192 The administration
unable to secure foreign backing and unwilling to act without Congressional
support, allowed the French to surrender Deinbienphu without any direct
American intervention.
a. Geneva Conference
The Geneva Conference of 1954 placed the United States in a
position it was unaccustomed to in peace negotiations. The United States had
allied itself strongly with the French, who were clearly not the undisputed
victors in Indochina. The Eisenhower administration was unable to dictate
terms, and rather than negotiate with communists on equal terms, preferred
not to negotiate at all. Commenting on the American position at the Geneva
Conference Anthony Short wrote:
On the assumption that, in the absence of victory, negotiation usually
involves concession, the prospect of a negotiated settlement at Geneva as
far as the US was concerned seemed to have disappeared the moment
Dulles set foot in Geneva.... [W]ith the US negotiating position set at
auto-destruct, it is hardly surprising that the Conference turned into a
sort of surrealist boxing match.... 193
This refusal to negotiate was consistent with the operational code of NSC 68,
which advocated negotiation from a position of strength only. Even before
the Geneva Conference was over the Eisenhower administration began
developing a strategy to deny all of Indochina to the Communists.
192 Herring, 33.




Some writers believe the Eisenhower decision to assume part of
the load previously carried by France in Vietnam began the inevitable slide
into the Vietnam War. George Kahin wrote:
The middle months of 1954 marked a major turning point in the
American relationship with Vietnam. It was during this period that the
United States made the most fundamental decision of its thirty-year
involvement. 194
The conclusion of the Geneva Conference and the temporary partition of
Vietnam forced the administration to make a decision on the ultimate
character of the revolution in Vietnam. If it was nationalistic, the United
States could accept reuniting Vietnam under Ho following the national
elections required by 1956. If Ho was seen as a mere tool of international
Communism, America could claim self-defense in intervening in southern
Vietnam. Following the logic of monolithic communism presented in NSC
68 the administration decided on the latter:
At this point, the Eisenhower administration adopted a change of policy
with momentous long-range implications.... Dulles informed
Congressional leaders on June 24 that any agreement that emerged from
Geneva would be "something we would have to gag about," but
nevertheless expressed optimism that the United States might still be
able to "salvage something" in Southeast Asia "free of the taint of
French colonialism." The United States would have to take over from
France responsibility for defending Laos, Cambodia and that part of




The completion of an international agreement could have provided some
political cover to the administration had it chosen to accept the Geneva
Declaration. Although their is no doubt that Eisenhower believed Vietnam
was a test case for international communism, his memoirs contain several
passages that indicate some flexibility of thought. For instance, he wrote, "It
was generally conceded that had an election been held, Ho Chi Minh would
have been elected." 196 Additionally he admitted, "there was no
incontrovertible evidence of overt Red Chinese participation in the
Indochina conflict." 197 Had he placed more faith in the instrumental value of
self determination, and characterized the Vietnamese Revolution as a
nationalist revolution led by a Communist, it would have given him an
idealistic leg to stand on to weather the storm of criticism.
South Vietnam was not a place to attempt to build a country.
Herring in America's Longest War asserted:
Had it looked all over the world, the United States could not have
chosen a less promising place for an experiment in nation-building....
Dulles admitted the chances of success might not be better than one in
ten. 19«
Eisenhower and Dulles were experienced statesman and one has to wonder
why they would commit the United States to a policy that had such a low-





commenting on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world?" at
press conference 7 April 1954, Eisenhower replied:
You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you
talk about such things. First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in
its production of materials that the world needs. Then you have the
possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical
to the free world. Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow
what you would call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of
dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the
last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a
beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound
influences. 199
Accepting the President's analysis one still has to wonder why he
was willing to risk American money and prestige in an area with such a low
chance of success. Kahin suggests five reasons in his book Intervention:
The enduring myth of communism was global and monolithic; the
conviction that China was expansionist; and American domestic
political pressures centering on the "loss of China" syndrome.... John
Foster Dulles's retrospective analysis—subscribed to by Eisenhower—of
American failure in China, and the lesson he derived from this for
policy toward Southeast Asia ["The territorial integrity of China became
shibboleth. We finally got a territorially integrated China—for whose
benefit? The Communists?"]; and ... the inspiration he and Eisenhower
drew from a set of analogies between conditions and the potential for
American actions in Vietnam, and recent American and British
experiences in other parts of the world. 211 "
199 Pentagon Papers, Vol. 1, 597.
200 Kahin, 66-67.
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When these reasons are compared with Kennan's critique of typical
American mistakes in foreign policy; universalistic legal-moral policies,
simplification of complex problems, refusal to discriminate vital from
nonvital and a propensity for force; one is struck by the number of typical
faults Kennan would and did find with this kind of reasoning.
The United States was determined to make an anti-communist
state out of South Vietnam and towards that end it poured funds into South
Vietnam. From 1955 to 1961, the United States gave more than $1 billion in
economic and military assistance to South Vietnam. In keeping with the
military bias of NSC 68, the Eisenhower administration gave four times as
much military aid as it did economic and technical assistance. Characterizing
America's early attempts at nation building in Vietnam George Herring
wrote:
The massive infusion of American aid thus kept South Vietnam alive,
but it fostered dependency rather than laying the foundation for a
genuinely independent nation.... Americans naively assumed that Diem
shared their political values; others were preoccupied with the security
problems which seemed most urgent.... In the eyes of most Americans,
moreover, the President's [Diem] vigorous anti-Communism more than
compensated for his shortcomings." 2 " 1
No one, in power, seemed to stop and reevaluate the importance of Vietnam
to American national security or national interests in light of the Diem
government's performance in nation building or in changes to the world




3. Kennedy Administration: "Go anywhere, pay any price"
By anyone's standards, Vietnam represents the most tragic legacy of
the Kennedy era's "go anywhere, pay any price rhetoric." President Kennedy
for all his talk of change, accepted most of the assumptions and policy
recommendations inherited from the Eisenhower administration with
regards to Vietnam. Summarizing the Kennedy view of Vietnam, Professor
George Kahin wrote:
John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency on January 20, 1961, with much
the same world view and set of assumptions about Vietnam as the
Eisenhower administration. This was also true of most of his advisors.
Despite growing evidence of serious strain between Moscow and Peking,
the forces of communism were regarded as an interlocked threat that
had to be met by the United States on a global basis. Nearly all American
officials still perceived Vietnamese communism as one of the fronts of
contest with the Soviet Union and China—critically dependent on these
two major communist powers rather than drawing most of its strength
from a fundamentally autonomous national foundation. And in terms
of American national interest, Vietnam remained a "domino" whose
fall would undermine and topple noncommunist regimes in
neighboring states. 202
Kahin's assessment is supported by numerous public statements by
administration officials. In an address on 28 April 1961, President Kennedy
asserted:
We live in a hazardous and dangerous time. I do not think it's possible
to overstate it.... Tonight, in Viet-nam, where the President was re-
elected recently in the last two weeks by a majority of 75 to 80 percent, yet
a small army of guerrillas, organized and sustained by the Communist
Viet Minh in the north, control most of the countryside in the
nighttime.... Now our great responsibility is to be the chief defender of
freedom, in this time of danger. Only the United States has the power
and the resources and the determination. We have committed
202 Kahin, 126.
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ourselves to the defense of dozens of countries stretched around the
globe who look to us for independence, who look to us for the defense of
their freedom. We are prepared to meet our obligations, but we can only
defend the freedom of those who are determined to be free themselves....
The Russians and the Chinese, containing within their borders nearly a
billion people, totally mobilized for the advance of the Communist
system.... 203
Adding President Kennedy's "go anywhere, pay any price" rhetoric to an
already poorly thought out strategy set the stage for a tragedy.
Faced with disappointing results from Eisenhower's nation building
program, Kennedy increased American military intervention in Vietnam. In
fact, the number of American advisors was allowed to exceed the limit of 685
set at Geneva, and by the time of his death the number of military advisors
had reached sixteen thousand. Kahin suggests:
Kennedy apparently had few reservations about having U.S. -piloted
helicopters and American military advisors go into combat, and soon
ordered this.... He might have gone further and introduced ground
combat units had Diem been willing to accept this.... 204
In keeping with NSC 68 thinking the Kennedy administration, when faced
with declining fortunes in South Vietnam, increased their military efforts.
a. Mansfield Mission
In December of 1962, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
visited South Vietnam at the President's request and privately reported to
President Kennedy on lack of progress since his last visit in 1955. He also
published a statement of his appraisal. "Had Kennedy been disposed to
change course in Vietnam, he could have used this well-publicized
21)3 Pentagon Papers, Vol 2, 802-803.
204 Kahin, 129.
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assessment as a foundation upon which to build a new policy." 205
Additionally, the feud between China and the Soviet Union was made public
in October of 1962, which should have lessened the fear of monolithic
communism. Presented with these and several other opportunities to exit
South Vietnam gracefully, President Kennedy chose to stay within the
comfortable confines of NSC 68.
4. Johnson Administration: Open Ended Commitment
The administration of Lyndon Baines Johnson marks the end of
limited commitments to South Vietnam. George Herring asserted in
America's Longest War that the Johnson administration "transformed a
limited commitment to assist the South Vietnamese government into an
open-ended commitment to preserve an independent, non-Communist
South Vietnam." 206
Initially, President Johnson kept on most of the advisors he inherited
from Kennedy and the administration's policy towards Vietnam did not
change. Nevertheless, as the political environment heated up Johnson felt
the need to act. Kahin asserted:
During the fall of 1964, as the political substance and military capacity of
the South Vietnamese government eroded ever more rapidly, it had
become starkly evident to Johnson's advisors that the policies they had
205 Kahin, 146., For additional reading see, Dean Rusk with Richard Rusk, As 1 Saw It,
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1990) Arthur Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy




been shaping ever since John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency had
failed.207
The operational code developed from NSC 68 provided the answer of why
the United States' nation building efforts in South Vietnam were failing. It
was not because the South Vietnamese government was incompetent, but
because communist aggression from the North was too powerful. Therefore,
if the North was the cause of the problems in the South, the way to fix the
problem was, of course, the application of military force.
a. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution normally serves as the line of
demarcation for Americans between hot and cold war in Vietnam. President
Johnson stressed the continuity of American policy toward Vietnam in
requesting the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. He said:
These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a
new and grave turn to the already serious situation in Southeast Asia.
Our commitments in the area are well known to the Congress. They
were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further
defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the
Senate in February 1955.
This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United
States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional
processes to meet communist aggression against any of the parties or
protocol states.
Our policy in Southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged
since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:




2. The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any
nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.
3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial
ambitions in the area.
4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front
of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South
Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these
countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence. 2(m
It is interesting that the first reason that President Johnson listed was
"America keeps her word." This suggests that the administration was
concerned more with the perception others held of it, than with doing what
was right under the circumstances. The importance placed on perception is
illustrated by an incident related in America's Longest War:
When a French diplomat observed that "the stakes in Europe were
enormous," but that if South Vietnam fell "we would not be losing
much," Secretary of State Rusk hotly retorted that if the United States did
not protect Vietnam, "our guarantees with regard to Berlin would lose
their credibility."209
Perceptions rather than national interest started to be perhaps the most
important driver for the rest of the conflict.
The Johnson Administration stands out in adherence to the
operational code of NSC 68. The administration was determined to defeat the
outside aggression. National Security Action Memorandum 273 declared that
the '"the central objective of the United States' was to assist the 'people and
government' of South Vietnam 'to win their contest against the externally
208 Pentagon Papers, Vol. 3, 720. (Italics in original).
209 Herring, 115.
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directed and supported communist conspiracy." 21 " The administration
continued to believe that the problems of South Vietnam were solvable by
American military might. The administration intervened directly with ever
increasing United States military pressure. When South Vietnamese
governments did not live up to American needs they went around them.
Independence of South Vietnam, according to Secretary of Defense
McNamara, "would demonstrate to the rest of the world [in] this 'test case'
the capacity of the United States to help a nation meet a Communist 'war of
liberation.'" 211 Finally, when the futility of the American strategy started to
become clear, and negotiations became a possibility, the administration began
playing the part of the victor. "The administration took a hard line from the
outset the terms for which they were prepared to hold out made virtually
certain that nothing would be accomplished."212
5. Nixon Administration: Peace With Honor?
"Throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Richard
Nixon, in his role as a major Republican spokesman, applauded our Vietnam
effort,"213 so asserted Paul Warnke in Vietnam Settlement: Why 1973, not
J 969?. In a 1967 Foreign Affairs article, Nixon defended the presence of
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allowed other "free nations" time to develop. Justifying American efforts
Nixon wrote, "Whatever one may think of the domino theory it is beyond
question that without the American Commitment in Vietnam, Asia would
be a far different place today."214 Although President Nixon did eventually
negotiate a peace treaty, he abandoned the operational code of NSC 68
reluctantly. In a national address on 14 May 1969 he made it clear that he still
accepted the ideas of a delicate balance of power and the importance of
maintaining a perception of power in the eyes of possible opponents.
Commenting on the need for a negotiated peace he declared:
Abandoning the South Vietnamese people, however, would jeopardize
more than lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten our long term
hopes for peace in the world. A great nation must be worthy of trust. 215
The conditions set for a peace treaty in this address also indicate the
traditional bias against negotiating without a clear military victory. Abram
Chayes later asserted that these conditions were not supportable by the actual
conditions in Vietnam. Writing in 1973, he alleged:
Although these proposals sounded good for domestic consumption ...
they were tantamount to a complete defeat for the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong. These objectives could not be achieved by
negotiation, only by military victory. 216
214 Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, October 1967, 111.
215 Richard M. Nixon, Setting the Course: The First Year, (New York, Funk and
Wagnalls, 1970), 14.
216 Abram Chayes, et al., Vietnam Settlement: Why 1973, Not 1969, Rational Debate
Series, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1973), 26.
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The crash program to Vietnamization of the war helped to reduce American
guilt. The quick collapse of the South Vietnamese government suggests the
American effort was doomed from the start because the heart of the majority
of South Vietnamese people was not in the fight.
B. LESSONS LEARNED?
Looking back at this case in United States history, one is amazed at the
ability of an operational code to survive basically intact throughout the
American intervention in Vietnam. The various administrations fed the
changing variables into this unchanging code, received the same answers and
applied those answers unquestioningly with the differences being only in
scale. The fear of defeat, and with it change in perception of power overseas,
that successive administrations voiced in reference to Vietnam, failed to
materialize. Even though the United States suffered a defeat in Vietnam, it
still possessed all of the elements of power that it held before the loss. In fact,
the events in Vietnam should have brought into question the whole
operational code of containment. Commenting on the lessons learned or not
learned Professor Herring declared:
The fundamental weakness of many of the lessens learned thus far is
that they assume the continued necessity and practicability of the
containment policy, at least in modified form, thereby evading or
ignoring altogether the central questions raised by the war. 217
Nevertheless, having settled on an operational code that seemed to work in




From the American experience in Vietnam, several lesson relating to
values can be drawn:
1. In order to bring all the elements of national power to bear on a
problem it must be seen as furthering the core values of the nation.
2. Public support for a protracted war is possible only when core values
are at stake.
3. Gradual escalation is possible only if it is continually explained in
terms of values, by a charismatic leader and accepted by public opinion.
4. Democracies may not be able to fight a protracted war without
continuing legitimization from political leaders.
Although it is impossible to prove, a case can be made suggesting that had
American policy makers placed more faith in traditional American values
such as tolerance, self determination and nonintervention, and less in the
importance of the application of force, this terrible chapter in American
history would not have been written. Successive American administrations
discounted the ability of the Vietnamese to make decisions on their own. As
American involvement increased, these administrations made more and
more decisions and eventually took responsibility for governing South
Vietnam. This is in complete defiance of the most fundamental values of the
United States. The Declaration of Independence posits, "all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights.... That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers form the consent of the governed." This means all
men possess the ability to make their own decisions and the responsibility to
live with the results. American policymakers, obsessed with the operational
code of containment, abandoned this the most basic of American values.
They became the arbitrators of who had the right of self determination, not
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only in Vietnam, but in most trouble spots around the world. One has to
wonder, if the debate had been framed in terms of aspirational and terminal
values, rather than in terms of the instrumental value of thwarting
communist expansion, whether the successive administrations would have
consistently followed the dictates of containment in Vietnam and elsewhere.
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IX. BUILDING A NEW PARADIGM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
A recurring theme in the current national security debate is the need for a
long term strategy to shape the new world order in terms favorable to
American ends. 218 There seems to be agreement among most policymakers
about the need for a long term approach to planning, however, developing
this approach has proven difficult. Traditionally, American policymakers
plan in an ad hoc manner, much like practitioners of normal science they
want to solve the current puzzle. Long-range planning presents many
problems which do not occur in short term planning that most people face
daily. Developing a successful operational code requires the same kind of
process that occurs in a revolution in science. The planning model described
in the following could serve as means of focusing and integrating the debate
on any suggested operational code.
Americans pride themselves on being doers and often denigrate those
who insist on planning details of every event. Not all planning requires the
train table precision that Americans like to avoid. For instance the vision of
America developed by the Founding Fathers lacked a specific blueprint for
realizing it. Nevertheless, it set out the direction that they believed the
country should go and the values necessary to judge American behavior. At
the most abstract level this was the basis of America's first operational code.
It served the country well, but with the closing of the frontier the era of
218 National Security Strategy of the United States, (White House, August 1991).
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nation building was over. The United States tried imperialism following the
Spanish American War but it was not compatible with America's principle of
self-determination, which was based on its core values. Wilsonian idealism
attempted to impose American values on the war torn Europe. Their
environment and history had not prepared them for such a large departure
from past policy. When Wilson's experiment failed the nation retreated into
isolationism. World War II showed that America could not remain aloof
from the world, but the problems of over involvement of the Cold War has
left America unsure of where its future lies.
A. LIMITS OF SHORT RANGE PLANNING
The reactive operational code of the Cold War led many leaders in the
United States to believe that planning short term operations constituted long
term strategic planning. Planning a campaign to thwart communist interest
in an area was thought to be strategy at the highest level. This mind set is
now finding it difficult to think in terms of lifetimes rather than years. Most
people are familiar and comfortable with the type of short range planning the
United States conducted during the Cold War. When faced with a situation
requiring a longer term outlook, they merely expanded their short term
model. This approach is of marginal effectiveness when applied to nations
over generations. As explained by Paul Bracken, a consultant to the RAND
Corporation:
An attempt to predict exactly what future military threats will be in ten
years will not work because (a) U.S. interests are so diverse; (b) in many
situations decisions are often made by idiosyncratic groups and
individuals that are intrinsically unpredictable (e.g., Future "Qaddafis");
and (c) our general ability to make long-term precise predictions is poor.
115
For these reasons it would be foolish to design forces to meet a specific
list of predicted threats. 219
Therefore a different approach to long range planning is needed to address
the dynamic nature of today's world.
B. PLANNING MODEL
In long range planning, a balance must be struck between interests, stated
at a high enough level of generality that allows consensus to be achieved, (e.g.
the Preamble to the Constitution), and those interests specific enough to
provide direction for planning (e. g. the Middle East peace process, reducing
Russian nuclear arms, Yugoslavia and the challenge of Japanese economic
power). The planner must allow for changing environments, and therefore
prepare alternative scenarios. These alternative scenarios could lead to
alternative national strategies, based on the actions of the actors outside the
United States. Adopting a completely scenario-driven national security
strategy would thus be reactive and ineffective. Although the United States
cannot unilaterally determine the world environment, its decisions have a
profound effect in shaping that environment. Therefore, the best a strategic
planner can do is to design a preferred environment and a basic strategy to
achieve it.
Interests, together with this core part of the environments, are relatively
constant and can therefore be employed to generate a specific set of
recommendations to policymakers. A 1973 Army War College Study, which
219 Faul Bracken, Strategic Planning for National Security: Lessons from Business
Experience, (Santa Monica: The RAND Strategy Assessment Center, Prepared for the Defense
Advisory Group Under Secretary of Defense for' Policy, February, 1990), 18, N3005-DAG/USDP.
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serves as the theoretical basis of this approach to long range planning,
explained the core strategy this way:
The core strategy consists of all those policies which remain constant
irrespective of differing environments.... The nation's core strategy is
necessarily abstract and extremely flexible, simply and directly stated for
the same reasons that mathematical axioms must be simply and straight
forwardly stated. For this reason it is convenient to present the nation's
core strategy as an elaboration of a few axiomatic principles which,
together, constitute a national doctrine. America's core strategies have
traditionally consisted of both the strategy and its associated doctrines,
but the formulation of both the strategy and its associated doctrine have
typically been less deliberate and self-conscious than intended. 220
Similarly, Paul Bracken commented, "A core strategy consists of all those
elements of policy that remain constant regardless of which environment
occurs."221 There are few things in American History that have remained as
constant its values. A clear understanding of these values is necessary in
order to formulate the core strategy, which should be the starting point for
any operational code.
C UNCHANGING VALUES & CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS
American aspirational and terminal values plus interests are the basis of
the core strategy, which has remained stable over time. The American
conception of what the preferred environment is and how best to realize it
has changed more often than the core strategy. For decades the preferred
environment was a contained Soviet Union. Having achieved that
220 Glikes, Richard J., Richard E. Mack, Robert M. Reuter, William V. Kennedy, William
H. Overholt, An Approach to Long-Range Strategic Planning. Carlisle Barracks. PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 15 October 1973, 2, MIRM 73-3. (Italics ours).
221 Bracken, 14.
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environment the United States is now cautiously looking for a new preferred
environment. In this planning model the means used to attain the preferred
environment are part of the basic strategy. To gain a consensus for a new
operational code, America must decide just what the preferred environment
they are striving for is. Then they must determine the means that they are
willing to use to work toward it. This model could serve to frame the debate,
which currently seems focused primarily on the margins. Finally, the
unfulfilled aspirational and terminal values of the Founding Fathers should
serve as the starting point for any discussion of the core and preferred
environments.
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X. KARL POPPER AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS
Should the United States actually articulate a new operational code, we
must bear in mind that this is just the beginning of a long process. "As Max
Weber pointed out, democracy must be regarded as a process rather than as an
attribute which a system does or does not possess."222 A democracy is an on
going process that requires active maintenance by its citizens, should we fail
in upholding this the most basic requirement of a democracy, then no
amount of planning or strategy will save the country.
Philosopher Karl Popper points out two basic approaches to governing in
his book The Open Society and Its Enemies. He calls them the piecemeal
social engineering process and the Utopian social engineering process. Popper
believed that the piecemeal approach was the only way for a free society and
democracy to survive. He described this process as:
The politician who adopts this method may or may not have a blueprint
of society before his mind, he may or may not hope that mankind will
one day realize and ideal state, and achieve happiness and perfection on
earth. But he will be aware that perfection, if at all attainable, is far
distant, and that every generation of men, and therefore also the living,
have a claim; perhaps not so much a claim to be made happy, for there
are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a claim not to be
made unhappy, where it can be avoided. They have a claim to be given
all possible help, if they suffer. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly,
adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and
most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for,
its greatest ultimate good. 223
222 Lipest, 316.
223 Popper, Vol. 1, 158.
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Pragmatic Americans have traditionally followed this piecemeal process,
which fits hand and glove with the Madisonian Model. In applying this idea
to strategy one must bear in mind that individuals are the key to any
democratic strategy and the final say on all matters. Therefore they must
somehow be included in the debate over a new operational code.
Popper defines the Utopian process in the following:
It is rational in the same degree as it pursues its aim consciously and
consistently, and as it determines its means according to this end....
These principles, if applied to the realm of political actively, demand that
we must determine our ultimate aim, or the Ideal State, before taking
any practical action. Only when this ultimate aim is determined, in
rough outline at least, only when we are in possession of something like
a blueprint of the society at which we aim, only then can we begin to
consider the best ways and means for its realization, and to draw up a
plan for practical action. 224
Americans have only flirted with this process of governing and rejected it
following painful results, such as, the red scare.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
Like any system or process, Popper's process of piecemeal social
engineering postulates several assumptions, which it shares with the
American political tradition. The piecemeal engineer, "believes that man is
the creator of his own destiny and that, in accordance with our aims, we can
influence or change the history of man just as we have changed the face of




that it is therefore man who is morally responsible for them."226 Therefore,
the piecemeal engineer postulates that "it is quite wrong to blame democracy
for the political shortcomings of a democratic state. We should rather blame
ourselves, that is to say, the citizens of the democratic state."227 Hence, Popper
suggests that the individual should be the center of the democratic process
and the final judge of its success or failure of any operational code. As the
Nation debates the merits of what will become a new paradigm, the primacy
of the individual in the open society must be kept in constantly in mind.
B. JUDGING POLICY
The American political system is a republic, which imparts duties as well
as rights upon its citizens. Referring back to his funeral oration, Pericles
reminds us, "'only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge
it....'"228 To accept this view Popper believes "the only attitude that I can
consider to be morally right is one which recognizes that we owe it to other
men to treat them and ourselves as rational,"229 and therefore able to judge
policy decisions themselves. Since Popper views democracy as a process he




229 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, 5th ed., (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966; reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 240.
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but of progress."230 The only way to measure this progress is in relation to
our values.
The end of any new strategy, whether viewed from the standpoint of the
Founding Fathers or the architects of the Cold War policy, must be based on
the terminal values of the Declaration of Independence or the Preamble of
the Constitution. It must restate the instrumental values of individual
welfare and continue along the well trodded path of democracy and the free
market. The complexities of the modern world only make more difficult the




XL THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE THIRD PARADIGM
Since the idea of a "new world order" first appeared, some people have
expected that soon a detailed blueprint would appear and definitively answer
all of their questions. Defining the "new world order," will prove to be
difficult. The consensus that developed behind the containment policy of the
Cold War did not solidify until the outbreak of the Korean War, which
seemed to confirm the assumptions of NSC 68. To expect the vision of the
new world order to evolve more rapidly than that of the Cold War policy of
containment is unreasonable.
Americans have been accused of acting rashly. This is not completely
accurate. Americans are actually slow to reach a decision, but swift in carrying
it out. French commentator R.L. Bruckberger in his 1959 work Image of
America asserted:
American are slow because they are profoundly aware that life is a
continuous movement, advancing only through contradictions and
becoming fuller and richer only as it succeeds in reconciling as far as
possible there contradictions, never when it ignores or silences them....
Americans are a slow people because of two seemingly contradictory
elements in their nature: a desire for compromise at almost, though not
quite, any price, and an undeniable rigidity wherever their honor and
their interest are concerned. But once they have reached a decision
—
either to compromise or, if compromise proves impossible, to refuse to
compromise—they are then as swift and direct in carrying out their
decision as they were slow and indirect in coming to it.... If Americans
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seem obsessed by the need for haste, it is because they are always slow to
start. 231
Before America can define its role in the new world order, it must reconcile
the contradiction between self-determination and revolution on the one
hand, and intervention and international order on the other.
For more than half of its existence the United States was able to follow
Jefferson's dictum of "no entangling alliances." Great Britain maintained the
balance of power in Europe, which allowed the United States access to
European markets and a free hand in the Western Hemisphere. According to
Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson the authors of The Imperial
Temptation during this period, "America was, 'the well-wisher to the
freedom and independence of all,' but she was 'the champion and vindicator
only of her own.'"232 The decline of British power had the effect of dragging
the United States into the power vacuum. President Wilson partially
justified American involvement in the First World War with the rhetoric
that America was fighting to make the world safe for democracy. This set a
precedent later used to justify intervention throughout the Cold War in
countries whose significance to American vital interests was often negligible.
Now that the stability of the balance of power is no longer considered as
delicate as it was during the Cold War, the United States must establish
criteria for what constitutes a threat to its vital interests and world stability.
231 Bruckberger, 45-46.
232 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Tlie Imperial Temptation: The New
World Order and America's Purpose, Uncorrected and Unrevised Proofs, (New York: Council on
Foreign Relation), 174.
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The National Security Strategy of August 1991 asserts, "We cannot be the
world's policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's security
problems. But we remain the country to whom others turn when in
distress." The strategy goes on to say, "In the end, we are answerable to our
own interests and our own conscience—to our ideals and to history—for what
we do with the power we have."233 This would seem to indicate a return to
the particularist balance of power policies that Kennan advocated and the
Founding Fathers practiced.
The rhetoric of the Gulf War has led some to question the Bush
administration's commitment to avoiding the world policeman role. Tucker
and Hendrickson in The Imperial Temptation argue:
The outlook that informs American foreign policy today, of which
Bush's vision of a new world order is a vivid expression, assumes that
aggression, wherever it might occur, is a disease to which this nation
must supply the antidote. 2?4
In contrast to this fear of universalism, there are a number of media
commentators who advocate a just such an universalistic policy to "solve"
the current unrest in the Balkans. For example, a New York Times editorial
of 23 April 1992 titled, "What if Bosnia Had Oil?" concludes, "If Americans
believe in the principle that aggression is intolerable, they will stand up for it,
oil or no oil."235 Adopting this sort of reasoning assumes that the people of
the Balkans can not restore order themselves and that it must be imposed on
233 The National Security Strategy, 2.
234 Tucker, 206-7.
235 The Neiv York Times, "What if Bosnia Had Oil?" 23 April 1992, A18.
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them from the outside. Particularists Tucker and Hendrickson suggest, "A
more detached view would allow us to see that aggression normally generates
powerful opposing forces among those most immediately threatened by it."236
America would be wise to adopt a particularist approach to the new world
order. The United States can do much to shape the new world order and
advance its national interest. To do this it must recognize the limited
American means available to counter the unlimited threats to national
security. To ensure its strength is not spent on peripheral issues, it should
develop a operational code based upon a clear articulation of the national
interest, the preferred environment it is striving for and the core values used
to select and judge American actions.
National Security Strategy
The Bush administration's National Security Strategy of the United States
August 1991 is now the broadest public statement of national security policy.
The National Security Strategy mentions four main interests or objectives
with numerous sub-objectives. 237 The four stated objectives are:
1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation,
with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people
secure.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for
individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home
and abroad.
3. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and
friendly nations.
236 Tucker, 207.
237 In January 1992 the Department of Defense released The National Military Strategy
of the United States, which shares these same interests and objectives.
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4. A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom,
human rights and democratic institutions flourish. 23H
According to Captain Mike Farmer, Assistant Deputy Director for Strategy and
Plans, Joint Staff J-5, the national security planning process develops it
defense strategy by planning to accomplish these objectives or insure these
interests. 239 This indicates the Joint Chiefs have not abandoned the use of the
short term planning model of the Cold War. Today's dynamic international
situation calls for a different approach to planning which thinks in terms of
generations.
These interests and objectives are general enough that one can assume
they will last into any long term scenario. Nevertheless, something is
missing from the National Security Strategy. Currently one would have a
hard time identifying what makes this strategy uniquely American. These
four main objectives could easily be mistaken for any of the other
industrialized democracies. The strategy gives no indication of a hierarchy or
decision matrix for use in deciding alternate courses of action when two or
more of the objectives are in conflict. Finally, it does not define what the
America's core and preferred environment are. Without a clear statement of
American core values and the preferred environment, the generalized
statement is of little practical value to the strategic planner.
238 National Security Strategy, 3-4.
239 Captain Mike Farmer, Assistant Deputy Director of Strategy and Plans, Joint Staff 1-5,
Lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 3 February 1992.
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A. VALUES AND PLANNING
Politicians frequently call for the need to return to "traditional American
values." The National Security Strategy Of The United States does nothing
to fill the need. In the Preface President Bush wrote:
We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few
generations have enjoyed-to build a new international system in
accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and
certainties crumble around us. 240
Later in the same document under the heading "The Contest Of Ideas And
The Nurturing Of Democracy" it states:
Recent history has shown how much ideas count. The Cold War was in
its decisive aspect, a war of ideas. But ideas count only when knowledge
spreads. In today's evolving political environment, and in the face of
the global explosion of information, we must make clear to our friends
and potential adversaries what we stand for.241
If you accept this premise on the importance of values and ideals, The
National Security Strategy leaves you wondering just exactly the President
had in mind. Values are rarely mentioned and never clearly stated. The
"Ideas" section concludes:
Through broadcasts, academic and cultural exchanges, press briefings,
publications, speakers and conferences, we engage those abroad in a
dialogue about who and what we are—to inform foreign audiences
about our policies, democratic tradition, pluralistic society and rich
academic and cultural diversity. We will increase our efforts to clarify
what America has to contribute to the solution of global problems—and
to drive home democracy's place in this process. 242




The preceding excerpts of the strategy are the closest it comes to defining what
these values are that America wants to spread and theoretically build upon
for its long term planning. The question that begs answering is which ideas
or values? The ideas of Jefferson and Madison or those of McCarthy.
Obviously, not all American values have proven equally lasting.
As America leaves the reactive Cold War mind set behind, recognizing
and internalizing the dictum of the ancient Greek philosopher Pericles
funeral oration would prove fruitful. He declared:
Our political system does not compete with institutions which are
elsewhere in force. We do not copy our neighbours, but try to be an
example. Our administration favours the many instead of the few: This
is why it is called a democracy. 243
It is time for America to stop looking over its shoulder to see who's gaining.
It should set the pace itself by defining what its core values are and what its
preferred future environment is. The only logical starting point for this
process is the core values inherited from the Founding Fathers.
B. CONCLUSION
The 17 February 1992 edition of The Nezv York Times printed seven
confidential scenarios that the Defense Department was developing as a basis
for planning. 244 The initial hostile congressional reaction to these scenarios
underlines the difficulty of selling long term defense planning, when the
strategy relies on short term threats and assumptions. The reaction of
243 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 1, 5th ed., (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966; reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 186.
244 Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold War Era:
Plans for Hypothetical Conflicts and Big Budgets," The New York Tunes 17 February 1992, Al.
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Congressmen Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee
is an excellent example. Less than a week later Congressman Aspin had
announced his own set of planning scenarios. Commenting on his scenarios
Congressman Aspin declared, "it is important that the choices be made
through a bottom-up method that relates force structure choices and the
different capabilities they buy to the sorts of threats America may face in the
new era." 245 If the Administration engages in a good scenario-bad scenario
game with the Congress, one thing is certain, the long term planning needed
to insure American security into the next millennium will be ad hoc at best;
like it was throughout the twentieth century. The days of bean counting
strategy should have passed away with the Soviets. What is needed is a new
approach to planning. A "bottom up" system is fine as long as the bottom
begins with the basic metaphysical assumptions of the Nation. Anything else
is akin to starting the walls of a house without first laying a solid foundation.
The new operational code of the United States can not insist upon some
easily quanitifiable Utopia, that comes equipped with a lockstep program to
march right to it. The world and humans are too complex to take such a
simplistic approach. American democracy is a process, as such, America's
operational code will be a process too. We must realize that the citizens of
America are not perfect, and that there will be discrepancies in their actions.
This does not excuse inappropriate behavior, but acknowledges that there will
be inconsistencies in the nation's application of its values.
245 Tyler, "Top Congressman Seeks Deeper Cuts in Military Budget: Counters Bush
Proposal," The New York Times, 23 February 1992, All.
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Samuel P. Huntington asserted in The Dilemma of American Ideals and
Institutions in Foreign Policy, "Critics say that America is a lie because its
reality falls so far short of its ideals. They are wrong. America is not a lie; it is
a disappointment. But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a
hope." 246 We must allow for this disappointment, but strive to eliminate it.
Finally, as the calls for a profound change to the American system resonate
throughout the current political campaign, it might be wise to remember a
line from William James classic book Pragmatism. When discussing changes
to an individuals belief system, he declared, "The most violent revolutions in
an individual's beliefs leaves most of his old order standing."247 Any changes
to the "old order" should build on the already strong foundation that the
Founding Fathers laid. America has used this foundation to erect the
framing of an open society and now must decide on some of the esoteric
features of the building, but starting all over again would be foolish, wasteful
and dangerous.
246 Samuel P. Huntington, The Dilemma of American Ideals and Institutions in Foreign
Policy, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), 17.
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